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This  paper  analyses  a  comprehensive  dataset  on  migration  using  robust  econometric 
methodologies to assess a range of economic and social impacts of migration on individuals 
and households left behind. Our findings indicate that there is no significant impact on labour 
force participation in households with migrants, but remittances do appear to have a negative 
effect on  labour force participation. Migration  (either absent or  returned)  increases  total per 
capita  expenditure  by  nearly  US$35  per  month  while  households  that  receive  remittances 
increase per capita expenditures by US$49 per month on average. Expenditures in health and 
education also increase. However, there is no effect on school attendance, while individuals 
living in a household with an absent migrant are almost 4 per cent less likely to state that their 
health is good. Households with migration experience are around 8 per cent less likely to keep 
their immediate families together, with this effect particularly pronounced in the sub-group of 
households with return migrants. Our policy recommendations emphasize the importance of 
family reunification, and issue that deserves more decisive policy actions on the part of the 
Colombian government.  
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1. Introduction 
 
Although Colombia was not a major sender or recipient of migrants  until recently, migration 
reached unprecedented levels in the late 1990s and since then has become a major social and 
economic issue. According to various sources of data, around 8 per cent of Colombians live 
abroad, mostly in the US, Spain and Venezuela. In 2008, international remittances constituted 3 
per cent of Colombia‟s GDP, compared to just 1 per cent in 1998. That this is a relatively recent 
phenomenon is also illustrated by the fact that 45 per cent of Colombians living in the US in 
2000 arrived during the previous decade (according to the US Census).  
 
These  trends  have  generated  an  increasing  interest  in  the  causes  and  consequences  of 
international  migration  in  Colombia.  In  this  study  we  focus  on  the  effects  of  international 
migration,  looking  in  particular  at  impacts  on  household  members  that  stay  in  Colombia. 
Although this issue has been previously analysed, the existing research has two limitations. 
First, surveys have been limited to very specific areas of the country. Second, surveys do not 
contain sufficient information on the migrant. To overcome these limitations, we carried out our 
own survey as part of the Development on the Move (DOTM) project, an initiative led by the 
Global Development Network (GDN) and the Institute for Public Policy Research (ippr). The 
survey is representative of the main 13 metropolitan areas of the country where international 
migration is concentrated.  It  asked  household members about their own characteristics and 
those of absent and returned migrants. Importantly, the survey also included questions about 
the socio-economic characteristics of the household at the moment of departure of the migrant. 
This allows us to investigate the effects of migration using more robust and non-experimental 
estimations than previous work (more information about our survey sampling strategy and report 
methodology can be found in Appendices A and B). 
 
Throughout the paper we define households with migration experience as those in which at 
least one member of the household, Colombian by birth, left the country within the last 10 years 
and is still absent out of the country; or that stayed for at least three months in another country 
and then returned (see Box 1 below).  A three month definition of migration differs from the 
usual definition used in official data sources, which only includes people who moved for a year 
or more. We feel our definition is more useful as it allows us to capture short-term, irregular and 
seasonal movement, as well as more permanent emigration. We also differentiate the effects of 
migration  experience  from  those  of  remittances:  some  households  may  record  migration 
experience and no remittances, and vice versa.  
 
 
Box 1: Definitions of migration 
 
  Migrant: Someone who has spent three months or more living continuously in a country other 
than that of their birth.  
  Household: people presently living together in the same dwelling most of the time, regardless 
of their legal place of residence, and who share income and expenses. 
  Absent migrant: A person who was born in the country of our study but who is currently living 
in another. We only examine people who went to live abroad in the last 10 years in order to try 
to minimise „recall errors‟ when respondents discuss them, so anyone who left more than 10 
years ago is not included in this category.  
  Returned migrant: A person who was born in the country of our study and who lives there 
now but who at some point has lived in another country for three months or more.  
  
 
Specifically, we use the DOTM dataset to assess the effects of migration and remittances on a 
broad set of household outcomes, such as labour participation, total per-capita expenditures,   3 
and expenditures on education, health, and other social goods. We also address the impact of 
migration  and  remittances  on  access  to  financial  services,  and  pay  special  attention  to  the 
consequences of migration for poverty and inequality. Finally, we investigate whether migration 
has  any  gender-specific  impacts,  and  look  into  the  non-monetary  dimensions  commonly 
referred as quality of life.  
 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 gives an historical overview of 
international  migration  in  Colombia  and  describes  the  socio-economic  characteristics  of 
migrants, using evidence from the DOTM dataset as well as other sources. Section 3 presents 
the findings of our impact analysis and offers some interpretations of these results. Section 4 
makes some policy recommendations based on our findings and analysis.  
 
2. Patterns of migration in Colombia 
 
This  section  provides  some  background  information  on  migration  in  Colombia,  focusing 
particularly on outwards migration to the US, Spain and Venezuela, which have been the main 
destination  countries  for  Colombian  migrants.  Based  on  various  sources  of  information, 
including US census data in particular, we also describe some socio-economic features of the 
average Colombian migrant.   
 
2.1  History of Colombian migration 
 
A recent consensus has been built regarding the number of international Colombian migrants, 
based on the 2005 Colombian Population Census, the Department of Administrative Security 
(DAS)  and  other  sources.  According  to  these  data,  there  are  3.3  million  Colombians  living 
abroad (approximately 8 per cent of the Colombian population). Unlike other Latin American and 
Caribbean countries, such as Argentina and Mexico, migration has not played a crucial role in 
the country‟s history. Although migratory waves have taken place in the past, they have tended 
to be relatively small. For example, Guarnizo (2003) and Gamarra (2003) show that the era of 
violence that took place in the country during the 1950s led to some migration to countries such 
as Venezuela, the US, Ecuador and Panama.  
 
Examining the causes of migration in the latter half of the twentieth century, Medina and Posso 
(2009) use the 2000 US Population Census to uncover the year that Colombian and other South 
American migrants  living  in  the  US first  arrived  there,  illustrating  that  periods  of  Colombian 
migration to the United States match those of other South American countries. This suggests 
that past migration flows were driven to a large extent by migration reform and rules in the US, 
rather  than  specific  conditions  in  the  sending  countries.  Gaviria  (2004)  argues  that  drug 
trafficking was another reason why Colombians migrated to the United States between 1975 
and 1990 (mainly to New York and Florida).  
 
Since the late 1990s Colombia experienced its largest recorded migration wave. According to 
border control authorities (DAS), almost 2 million Colombians migrated between 1998 and 2008. 
The determinants of these outflows have been studied, and the dominant viewpoint is that the 
main cause was the deep economic crisis of 1998-2000, which resulted in unemployment rates 
reaching  an  unprecedented  20  per  cent.
1  Authors  also  typically  mention  the  effects  of  the 
deterioration of social conditions in the country. Figures 1 and 2 illustrate how the timing of the 
economic  cycle,  and  the  internal  conflict  conditions,  matched  that  of  the  net  outflows  of 
Colombians in the late 1990s to Spain and the United States (Figures 3a and 3b). 
 
                                                           
1 See Solimano (2003), Centro de Estudios Monetarios Latinoamericanos (2007) and Cárdenas and Mejía (2009).   4 
Figure 1: Economic fluctuations and Colombian migration 
 
GDP cycle and Net outflows of migrants       Unemployment rate and net outflows of migrants 
 
Source: Administrative Department of Security (DAS) and Department of National Statistics (DANE) 
 
 
Figure 2: Conflict and Colombian migration 
      
Homicides and migration        Kidnappings and migration  
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Figure 3a: Selected South American migration flows to Spain (in thousands of people) 
 
 
Source: Instituto Nacional de Estadística de España 
 
Figure 3b: Colombian migration to the US (in thousands of people) 
 
 
Sources: US Citizenship and Immigration Services 
 
According to the 2005 Colombian census raw data, there are only about 460,000 Colombians 
abroad; just 14 per cent of the estimated figure previously reported, and around 1 per cent of 
Colombia‟s population (as opposed to the estimated 8 per cent). This difference isl arge but 
unsurprising as some individuals are reluctant to report having relatives abroad when they are 
illegal. Also, census data does not include entire families that migrate. For these reasons the 
census data has been adjusted to reflect a number closer to 8 per cent of the population (which 
is Colombia‟s official migrants figure). Figure 4 shows that according to the 2005 Colombian 


















































































































































































































































Number of people (right axis) % of total immigrants (left axis)  6 
followed by Spain (23 per cent) and Venezuela (20 per cent). These three countries together 
host more than 78 per cent of Colombian migrants. 
 
Figure 4: Residence of Colombian migrants in 2005 
 
 
Source: 2005 Population Census (National Administrative Department of Statistics (DANE) 
 
 
2.2  The geography of Colombian migration 
  
In  order  to  illustrate  the  spatial  composition  of  migration,  we  map  the  specific  places  in 
Colombia which migrants are leaving from, and the countries they are moving to (again using 
the  information  from  the  2005  Colombian  Population  Census).  Map  1  shows  the  share  of 
migrants in the population of each municipality organized by quintile (the darke black is the top 
quintile and white represents the bottom quintile). The map on the top left is for the total migrant 
population, whereas the other three represent the same figures by  main destination: United 
States, Spain, and Venezuela.  
 
To simplify the analysis, Map 2 includes only the main agglomerations of municipalities with the 
largest shares of migrants by destination.
2 There are four main agglomerations of municipalities 
with large share of their populations represented by international migrants: the northeast zone, 
which includes municipalities in the states of Atlántico, Bolívar and Magdalena; the western 
zone, which includes the states of Risaralda, Quindío, Caldas, Valle del Cauca, and Cauca; the 
northeast zone, which includes the states of Santander, Norte de Santander, and Boyacá; and 
Bogotá. 
 
As shown in the maps, municipalities sending migrants to the United States are mainly located 
in  the  states  of  Valle  del  Cauca,  Cauca,  Risaralda,  Quindío,  Caldas  and  Antioquia;  those 
                                                           
2 These are clusters of municipalities from where there are a number of migrants significantly higher than that of their 
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sending migrants to Spain are located mainly in the same zone as those sending to the United 
States, and finally, those sending migrants to Venezuela are located mainly in Atlántico, Bolívar, 
Magdalena, Boyacá, and Norte de Santander. 
 
Identifying the driving forces that determine where people from specific regions are more likely 
to migrate to is beyond the scope of this paper. Proximity seems an important determinant for 
migration and immigration to and from neighbouring countries, and that seems evident for the 
cases of Venezuela and Ecuador. Nonetheless, it is not clear why there is more migration to 
countries like the US or Spain from specific regions of the country. Migrating to the US or Spain 
is costly, requiring minimum levels of income and the existence of networks to reduce those 
costs.  Apart  from  that  general  observation,  it  is  interesting  that  the  coffee  producing 
departments of Antioquia, Caldas and Valle are the main regions exporting migrants to the US 
and Spain. These can be the result of a combination of economic factors (higher income and 
years of schooling) and cultural (descendants of internal migrants that came from Antioquia in 
the late 19
th century, export-oriented sources of income, etc.).  Also, between 1970 and 1990, 
the production and trafficking of marijuana, cocaine and heroin, mostly to the US market, mainly 
stemmed from  Antioquia and Valle (where the  Medellín and Cali drug cartels were based). 
Gamarra (2003) goes further to argue that the second migratory wave of Colombians to the US, 
which he reports to have taken place since the late 1970s until the mid 1990s, was related to 
the movement of migrants linked to the growth in the international trade of narcotics.
3 He cites 
various sources that allow him to affirm that between 40 to 50 per cent of Colombians in Florida 




   
                                                           
3 See also Thouni (1995) and Gugliotta and Leen (1989)   8 
Map 1: Quintiles of the share of migrant population per municipality in 2005 (total and by 
destination) 
 
   9 





1. Amazonas 2. Antioquia 3. Arauca 4. Atlántico 5. Bolívar 6. Boyacá 7. Caldas 8. Caquetá 9. Casanare 10. Cauca 
11.  César  12.  Chocó  13.  Córdoba  14.  Cundinamarca  15.  Guainía  16.  Guaviare  17.  Huila  18.  La  Guajira  19. 
Magdalena 20. Meta 21. Nariño 22. Norte de Santander 23. Putumayo 24. Quindío 25. Risaralda 26. Santander 27. 





2.3  Characteristics of migrants 
 
To develop a picture of Colombian absent and return migrants we use different sources of data 
which complement one another and provide a more  accurate socio-economic description of 
Colombians living abroad than has been produced to date: 
  
  the 2000 US Population Census; 
  the AMCO (West Central Metropolitan Area) Survey conducted in 2004 by DANE, the 
national statistical office, which interviewed a random sample of households living in 
Pereira‟s metropolitan area; 
  the  RCN  survey,  which  is  a  survey  implemented  by  the  Colombian  radio  and  TV 
private firm Radio Cadena Nacional which migrants freely fill out on the web; and 
  our DOTM survey. 
 
When we compare the figures in the different columns of Table 1 above, we find that return 
migrants tend to be older than absent migrants. Looking at the educational levels of both types 
of migrants, we also find that while  in our DOTM survey return migrants appear to be less 
educated, they seem to be more educated in the sample of the AMCO and RCN surveys.  
 
The difference in these results might be explained by a few factors: first, since the RCN survey 
was completed by people who self-select themselves on the web, it is likely that the subset of 
returnees who answered it are more familiar with new technologies like the internet, and are 
therefore less representative of the typical return migrant but rather a subset of them that is, on 
average,  more  educated.  Second,  the  AMCO  survey  only  covers  the  metropolitan  area  of 
Pereira, which was subject to an enormous volume of migration in the late 1990s and thus has a 
younger migrant population than the average of the 13 main metropolitan areas surveyed in our 
project.  Since  younger  generations  in  Colombia  have  on  average  more  schooling,  an  older 
return migrant (more likely to be captured by the DOTM survey) is likely to have less tears of 
education than a younger one (more likely to be captured by the AMCO survey).  
 
There is also a considerable difference in our DOTM sample in terms of the number of return 
migrants that speak English, which is much smaller than the number reported by returnees in 
the AMCO or RCN surveys. This difference might be partly explained by the fact that according 
to the DOTM survey, returnees from Venezuela (who are less likely to speak English) represent 
40 per cent of all returnees, while according to the 2005 census they constitute just 21 per cent. 
Meanwhile, returnees from the US represent 21 per cent of all returnees in the DOTM survey, 
while according to the 2005 census they are just over 32 per cent.  
     11 
 
 
Table 1: Characteristics of absent and returned Colombian migrants 
  
  
Absent migrants  Returned migrants 
AMCO  US 
Census 
RCN 
Survey  DOTM  AMCO  RCN 




Age  36.14  41.80     33.51  39.40     42.83  36.27 
Years of schooling  11.52  12.30  14.50  10.04  12.88  14.25  7.60  11.02 
Sex (Men)  46.9%  43.9%     43.7%  66.7%     47.3%  51.1% 
Single  29.8%  22.8%        19.7%     21.1%  36.3% 
Years of residence 
abroad  6.80     5.50  5.66  3.80  5.30  2.17    







81.0%  81.8% 
           
Employed  82.0%  64.2%     76.8%  76.7%     48.1%  47.9% 
Unemployed  5.3%  7.7%              6.5%  4.2% 
Speaks English     62.3%  79,1%*     55.6%  75,7%*  9.4%  41.7% 
Spouse has lived 
abroad              21.8%     38.9%    
Parents have lived 
abroad              18.6%          
Sends remittances  71.2%     73.2%  54.5%  99.1%  70.2%  31.8%    
Monthly average 
amount in US$  166.8     247.6  254.1             
Spouse lives in 
Colombia        5.0%  8.5%     5.7%       
Children live in 
Colombia        21.0%  41.5%     21.5%       
Parents live in 
Colombia        73.8%        73.2%       
Sources: Medina and Cardona (2006) and authors‟ calculations based on the DOTM Colombian Household Survey 
(* In this survey applies if speaks a language different to English. ** In this survey applies to those who claim they 
wish to return). 
 
 
The different concentration of migrants in different destination countries in the DOTM and other 
surveys,  in  turn, may  be  related  to the fact that  DOTM  examines  short term  and  seasonal 
migration (including migration for 3–12 months), as well as the longer movements which tend to 
be the focus of other surveys. Given that seasonal and short term moves frequently take place 
over shorter distances, this may help to explain why the DOTM survey finds that a greater 
proportion  of  migration  takes  place  between  Colombia  and  its  neighbouring  countries  than 
previous analyses.   
 
Drawing out some of the other key facts from the different data sources, it appears that: 
   12 
  Both absent and return migrants are more likely to be female.  
 
  According to the AMCO survey, 67 per cent of absent migrants reported leaving for work-
related reasons, 17 per cent migrated to study, 11 per cent left for family related reasons 
and 5 per cent departed because of armed conflict.  
 
  According to the 2000 US Population Census, the majority of Colombians living in the US 
are not US citizens, while 80 per cent live with their families, and half of these have children 
under 18 years of age. Slightly more women (54 per cent) have migrated to the US than 
men (46 per cent), which is consistent with data from other sources.  
 
  Migrants tend to have more years of schooling than the average Colombian: just over 12 
years compared to nearly 9 years. In addition, 30 per cent of the migrants over 25 years of 
age have tertiary education, compared to only 5 per cent of the population in Colombia.  
 
  The average income of migrants is approximately US$25,000 per year in the US, compared 
to US$6,200 in Colombia (PPP adjusted).
4  
 
Following  this  broad  review  of  migrants‟  characteristics  taken  from  the  various  available 
surveys, we use the DOTM dataset to examine certain characteristics in greater depth. Table 2 
provides some descriptive statistics for households with and without experience of migration, 
while Table 3 compares households that do and do not receive remittances.  
The characteristics of households receiving remittances are similar to those of households that 
contain migrants. This will be explained in part by the fact that many households fall into both 
groups (though households can receive remittances even if one of their own members has not 
migrated, and vice versa). Findings from the DOTM survey indicate that almost 43 per cent of 
households with experience of migration (i.e. containing absent and/or return migrants) receive 
remittances,  with  nearly  30  per  cent  of  these  being  households  with  return  migrants  only.  
Meanwhile,  nearly  4  per  cent  of  households  without  experience  of  migration  receive 
remittances.   This figure  sounds  small,  but  as  this group  make  up the  vast  majority  of  the 
Colombian  population,  it  actually  adds  quite  significantly  to  the  total  number  of  households 
receiving  remittances.  In  fact,  they  make  up  64  per  cent  of  all  Colombian  households  that 
receive remittances. Households with absent migrants that receive remittances make up the 





   
                                                           
4 Throughout this report, we use $ to denote Colombian pesos and US$ for US dollar figures. The exchange rate is 
approximately COP$2,000 per US dollar (June 2009). Unless indicated otherwise, monetary figures correspond to 
per month measures.   13 








experience  t 
Mean  Standard 
deviation  Mean  Standard 
deviation 
0-5 (number of people 5 years ago)  0.379  0.729  0.383  0.62  -0.1 
6-17 (number of people 5 years ago)  0.762  0.978  0.922  1.036  -2.76** 
18-29 (number of people 5 years ago)  0.712  0.899  0.828  0.899  -2.24** 
30-39 (number of people 5 years ago)  0.485  0.702  0.536  0.705  -1.25 
40-49 (number of people 5 years ago)  0.442  0.645  0.559  0.736  -2.92** 
50-59 (number of people 5 years ago)  0.362  0.651  0.295  0.588  1.86* 
60+ (number of people 5 years ago)  0.524  0.708  0.314  0.607  5.51** 
Highest number of years of education for 
members of the Hhold aged 25+  10.837  4.082  8.737  3.571  9.29** 
[Highest number of years of education for 
members of the Hhold aged 25+]²  134.102  92.634  89.093  63.666  9.63** 
Lowest number of years of education for 
members of the Hhold aged 25+  5.892  4.148  6.064  3.745  -0.74 
[Lowest number of years of education for 
members of the Hhold aged 25+]²  51.921  64.021  50.791  51.465  0.33 
Number of people in household 5 years 
ago  4.355  2.121  3.643  2.086  5.86** 
Did any current member of the household 
respond differently to other members to 
the question: "Where did you live 5 years 
ago?" 
0.06  0.237  0.08  0.271  -1.36 
Did the household have an account in a 
financial institution 5 years ago?  0.412  0.492  0.365  0.482  1.66* 
If so, did the household use this account 
to fund a business 5 years ago?  0.051  0.22  0.06  0.237  -0.69 
Labour participation 5 years ago (males)  0.604  0.436  0.614  0.429  -0.36 
Labour participation 5 years ago 
(females)  0.396  0.43  0.421  0.427  -0.99 
Did the household own the home that it 
lived in 5 years ago?  0.713  0.452  0.553  0.497  5.84** 
Did the household have access to land 5 
years ago?  0.034  0.182  0.028  0.166  0.58 
Did the household own at least one 
business 5 years ago?  0.112  0.315  0.15  0.357  -1.98** 
Source: DOTM Colombian Household Survey (authors‟ calculations) 
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remittances  t 
Mean  Standard 
deviation  Mean  Standard 
deviation 
0-5 (number of people 5 years ago)  0.5  0.672  0.377  0.62  2.65** 
6-17 (number of people 5 years ago)  0.995  0.789  0.914  1.047  1.28 
18-29 (number of people 5 years ago)  0.714  0.692  0.83  0.907  -2.10** 
30-39 (number of people 5 years ago)  0.651  0.684  0.528  0.706  2.50** 
40-49 (number of people 5 years ago)  0.468  0.718  0.563  0.735  -1.82* 
50-59 (number of people 5 years ago)  0.233  0.545  0.3  0.592  -1.67* 
60+ (number of people 5 years ago)  0.462  0.71  0.311  0.602  3.14** 
Highest number of years of education for 
members of the Hhold aged 25+  9.896  3.677  8.719  3.575  4.46** 
[Highest number of years of education for 
members of the Hhold aged 25+]²  111.456  71.489  88.799  63.913  4.54** 
Lowest number of years of education for 
members of the Hhold aged 25+  6.125  4.247  6.044  3.714  0.28 
[Lowest number of years of education for 
members of the Hhold aged 25+]²  55.545  60.283  50.321  50.889  1.26 
Number of people in household 5 years 
ago  4.134  1.647  3.641  2.116  3.79** 
Did any current member of the household 
respond differently to other members to 
the question: "Where did you live 5 years 
ago?" 
0.046  0.209  0.081  0.273  -2.10** 
Did the household have an account in a 
financial institution 5 years ago?  0.293  0.455  0.37  0.483  -2.31** 
If so, did the household use this account 
to fund a business 5 years ago?  0.05  0.219  0.06  0.237  -0.59 
Labour participation 5 years ago (males)  0.489  0.444  0.543  0.449  -1.69* 
Labour participation 5 years ago 
(females)  0.336  0.387  0.411  0.429  -2.61** 
Did the household own the home that it 
lived in 5 years ago?  0.558  0.497  0.557  0.497  0.03 
Did the household have access to land 5 
years ago?  0.025  0.157  0.028  0.166  -0.26 
Did the household own at least one 
business 5 years ago?  0.128  0.334  0.151  0.358  -0.94 
Number of people with complete tertiary 
education or more  0.131  0.394  0.102  0.367  1.05 
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3. Impact analysis of migration and remittances 
 
In  this  section,  we  evaluate  the  impacts  of  migration  and  remittances  on  a  broad  set  of 
economic, educational, health, quality of life, and gender outcomes (for the household members 
that stay in Colombia). These impacts can take place through various different channels, from 
the most straightforward - income in the form of remittances (which has been widely analysed, 
for  example  by Rapoport and Docquier (2006))  –  to others such as diaspora networks and 
return  migration,  as  suggested  by  Katseli  et  al.  (2006).  In  our  impact  analysis  we  do  not 
specifically examine the channels through which the impacts are occurring, but we do make 
suggestions as to the main channels through which migration and remittances might be driving 
our results. We use a propensity score matching methodology to undertake our impact analysis, 
which should provide relatively accurate estimations. An outline of this methodology is provided 
in Appendix B.  
 
3.1   Labour market impacts 
 
In  this  section  we  consider  the  effects  of  migration  and  remittances  on  labour  market 
participation and unemployment. The experience of migration may affect decisions regarding 
labour market participation in various ways.  
 
For example, income from remittances can reduce the incentive to participate in the labour force 
for  some  members  of the  household  through  increasing  the  „reservation  wage‟  (that  is,  the 
lowest wage for which they would be willing to work). In other cases, remittances may facilitate 
the  establishment  of  family  businesses,  leading  some  household  members  to  shift  to  self 
employment. In the case of returned migrants, greater labour market participation could result 
from higher human capital accumulated abroad. There are also potential general equilibrium 
effects – effects which spread beyond the migrant and their household out into wider society – 
with migration impacting upon on the unemployment rate, for example, or on wage rates paid.  
 
In the case of returned migrants, greater labour market participation could be the result of higher 
human  capital  accumulated  abroad.  There  are  also  potential  general  equilibrium  effects 
resulting from the impact of migration on the unemployment rate and the equilibrium wage. The 
empirical evidence available for other countries points in the direction of lower participation rates 
for households receiving remittances. This is what Acosta (2006) has found for adult females in 
El Salvador and Mishra (2003) in rural Mexico. In addition, the World Bank (2006) finds that for 
a large sample of Latin American countries, remittances reduce both labour force participation 
and hours of work. 
 
Table 4 presents the labour market results based on matching estimates.
5 The „ATT column‟ is 
the estimate of the impact of migration experience or remittances according to the row studied, 
and the final column presents the t-statistic of the estimate. Table 4 has cross section (CS) and 
difference-in-differences  (DD)  results  at  the  individual  level  for  the  impact  of  migration 
experience  and  remittances  on  labour  participation,  the  unemployment  rate  and  self-
employment (only CS estimates in this case). 
                                                           
5 Unless otherwise noted, all graphs use the following definitions:  
ATT: Average effect of Treatment on the Treated; ME: Effect of Migration Experience; RR: Effect of Receiving 
Remittances: Family (compares households receiving remittances from relatives with households that do not receive 
remittances), and All (compares households receiving remittances from any source with households not receiving 
remittances).    16 
Table 4: Effects of migration experience and remittances in the labour market  
 
   Males and Females  Males  Females 
Cross Section Estimators 
   ATT  Std. Err.  t  ATT  Std. Err.  t  ATT  Std. Err.  t 
Labour Participation 
ME  -0.028  0.017  -1.659*  -0.047  0.029  -1.61  -0.012  0.024  -0.51 
ME Absent  -0.058  0.019  -3.071**  -0.083  0.023  -3.594**  -0.030  0.025  -1.17 
ME Returnee  -0.032  0.022  -1.46  -0.054  0.032  -1.673*  -0.012  0.027  -0.44 
RR Family  -0.089  0.021  -4.195**  -0.110  0.028  -3.961**  -0.063  0.027  -2.384** 
RR All  -0.072  0.021  -3.392**  -0.096  0.029  -3.259**  -0.041  0.028  -1.44 
Unemployment Rate 
ME  0.007  0.008  0.95  0.029  0.015  1.992**  -0.014  0.007  -1.93* 
ME Absent  0.003  0.008  0.39  0.030  0.016  1.817*  -0.018  0.008  -2.328** 
ME Returnee  0.010  0.012  0.88  0.021  0.018  1.18  0.001  0.012  0.09 
RR Family  0.008  0.013  0.67  0.050  0.025  2.037**  -0.022  0.009  -2.507** 
RR All  0.008  0.011  0.75  0.044  0.021  2.045**  -0.017  0.008  -2.114** 
Self-Employment 
ME  0.007  0.013  0.56  0.023  0.026  0.90  -0.010  0.015  -0.68 
ME Absent  0.004  0.016  0.23  0.018  0.027  0.68  -0.003  0.019  -0.18 
ME Returnee  0.000  0.017  0.01  0.014  0.025  0.55  -0.011  0.018  -0.61 
RR Family  -0.011  0.014  -0.74  -0.020  0.028  -0.74  0.002  0.024  0.07 
RR All  -0.007  0.013  -0.57  -0.027  0.028  -0.96  0.014  0.019  0.72 
Difference-in-Differences Estimators 
   ATT  Std. Err.  t  ATT  Std. Err.  t  ATT  Std. Err.  t 
Labour Participation 
ME  -0.010  0.017  -0.60  -0.007  0.022  -0.33  -0.011  0.023  -0.49 
ME Absent  -0.027  0.017  -1.57  -0.020  0.026  -0.78  -0.032  0.029  -1.10 
ME Returnee  -0.024  0.020  -1.22  0.000  0.023  -0.01  -0.031  0.030  -1.04 
RR Family  -0.027  0.019  -1.46  -0.004  0.029  -0.15  -0.040  0.024  -1.645* 
RR All  -0.035  0.021  -1.642*  -0.016  0.026  -0.61  -0.047  0.027  -1.754* 
Unemployment Rate 
ME  0.000  0.009  0.03  0.023  0.018  1.25  -0.020  0.011  -1.909* 
ME Absent  0.002  0.012  0.18  0.034  0.020  1.737*  -0.022  0.010  -2.106** 
ME Returnee  -0.002  0.012  -0.13  0.004  0.021  0.20  -0.006  0.014  -0.44 
RR Family  0.010  0.012  0.85  0.062  0.026  2.365**  -0.023  0.013  -1.792* 
RR All  0.004  0.010  0.36  0.039  0.026  1.51  -0.022  0.013  -1.63 
Source: DOTM Colombian Household Survey (authors‟ calculations) 
 
Although it might be expected that the labour force participation rate of household members 
would be affected if the household contained an absent and/or return migrant, the reported 
results suggest that this is not the case. According to our CS estimates, there is some weak 
evidence that migration experience would reduce labour participation by nearly 3 per cent, and 
almost 6 per cent in households with an absent migrant. As it becomes clear from the table, the 
effect is driven by the response of males living in households with an absent migrant, who would   17 
be just over 8 per cent less likely to participate. However, according to our DD estimates, which 
are more accurate, these magnitudes are smaller and not significant. 
 
On the contrary, remittances do seem to have a negative effect on labour force participation 
according to both our CS and DD estimates. Here we rely more on our DD estimates, according 
to which individuals in households receiving remittances from any source are between 3-4 per 
cent less likely to participate in the labour market, an effect mostly driven by the responses of 
females, who are almost 5 per cent less likely to participate. 
 
In terms of the unemployment rate in Colombia, both CS and DD estimates lead to similar 
conclusions. Migration does not affect unemployment for the whole set of surveyed individuals, 
although we find that the unemployment rate for females falls by 2 per cent, in particular, if they 
belong to a household with an absent migrant. There is also a weakly significant positive effect 
for males living in households with an absent migrant. In that case, male unemployment rates 
increase by a little over 3 per cent. Meanwhile, remittances sent by family members increase 
the unemployment rate of all individuals by around 2 per cent, which is the result of opposite 
effects on males‟ and females‟ unemployment rates, with males‟ rising by between 6-7 per cent, 
and females‟ declining  by just over 2 per cent. 
 
Cross  section  estimates  of  the  effects  of  migration  experience  and  remittances  on  self-
employment are shown in the bottom panel of the cross section estimates in Table 4. Results 
show that neither the experience of migration nor remittances have a significant effect on the 
probability that household members become self-employed.   
 
3.2  Impacts on household per-capita income and expenditure  
 
In this section we study the effect of migration experience and remittances on households‟ per 
capita  income  with  and  without  remittances,  that  is,  including  all  sources  of  income  in  the 
household but remittances. Although our main objective is related to the latter, the former will 
allow us to see how vulnerable households would be if they stopped receiving these funds. 
 
Table  5  shows  that  household  per-capita  income  without  remittances  is  only  affected  by 
migration in households with an absent migrant, in which case monthly income is increased 
about $143,000 (or US$71.50), while household per-capita income with remittances increases 
on average for households with migration experience, mostly due to the effect of households 
with an absent migrant, in which case income is increased by about $195,000 (US$97.50). 
 
These results imply that the largest share of any increase in household per capita income is 
more  likely  to  be caused  by  benefits  derived  from  migration  other  than  the  current  level  of 
remittances received. Those other benefits may derive from previous remittances received by 
the  household  members,  and  used  for  example  for  human  capital  accumulation  (such  as 
investments in education or health), savings or to build up the household‟s stock of assets (such 
as businesses, or to improve housing). They may also result from transfers of knowledge either 
directly (through the absent migrant) or indirectly (by being in touch with the absent migrant‟s 
environment and culture). 
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Table 5: Effects of migration and remittances on per-capita income and expenditure 
 
   ATT  Std. Err.  t  ATT  Std. Err.  t 
  
Household Per-capita Income without 
Remittances  Per-capita Home Products Expend. 
ME  83,140  63,657  1.31  12,859  9,479  1.36 
ME Absent  143,000  64,006  2.228**  33,658  12,456  2.702** 
ME Returnee  85,524  68,479  1.25  16,479  9,926  1.66* 
RR Family  -5,957  75,966  -0.08  31,546  14,417  2.188** 
RR All  77,047  67,816  1.14  28,753  12,661  2.271** 
  
Household Per-capita Income with 
Remittances  Per-capita Recreation Expenditure 
ME  107,000  66,599  1.60  3,857  2,354  1.638* 
ME Absent  195,000  72,245  2.702**  4,291  2,774  1.55 
ME Returnee  98,957  77,055  1.28  2,605  1,416  1.839* 
RR Family  48,486  73,773  0.66  2,834  1,725  1.643* 
RR All  125,000  58,127  2.154**  3,386  1,513  2.238** 
   Total Per-capita Expenditure  Per-capita Housing Expenditure 
ME  69,749  25,413  2.745**  -6,322  4,919  -1.29 
ME Absent  83,384  37,078  2.249**  -11,500  22,502  -0.51 
ME Returnee  87,722  23,307  3.764**  -5,486  7,018  -0.78 
RR Family  96,878  38,879  2.492**  -7,807  7,071  -1.10 
RR All  74,152  29,137  2.545**  -9,441  6,712  -1.41 
Source: DOTM Colombian Household Survey (authors‟ calculations) 
 
When  we  study  the  effect  on  households‟  per-capita  income  including  remittances  in 
households‟ income, we also find a positive effect of remittances. According to our estimates, 
monthly  household  per-capita  income  would  increase  up  to  $125,000  (about  US$62)  for 
households receiving remittances from any source.
6  
 
Table 5 also shows the impacts of migration and remittances on several types of expenditures. 
Both  migration  and  remittances  increase  total  per-capita  expenditure.  Migration  experience 
increases  it  by  nearly  $70,000  (US$35),  while  remittances  increase  it  by  between  $74,000 
(US$37) and $97,000 ($US48.50). The table looks at the effects on per-capita expenditure of 
home products (groceries, toiletries and cosmetics, supplies for cleaning the house, food and 
alcoholic drinks consumed within the household), recreation, and housing (buying or repairing 
the house).  
 
Migration does not appear to have a significant effect on the whole population for any of these 
expenditures  except  for  recreation  (at  the  10  per  cent  level  of  significance),  and  mostly  in 
households  with  return  migrants.  Expenditure  on  home  products  also  increases  when  we 
assess households with absent and return migrants. Remittances also seem to have a positive 




                                                           
6 This may appear to contradict the result discussed in the paragraph above, where it appeared as though the effect 
of remittances was $52,000. It should be noted, however, that households receiving remittances from any source 
include many households who do not have migration experience, and vice versa.   19 
3.3  Impacts on inequality 
 
Existing evidence of the effect of remittances on income inequality in Latin American countries 
is  mixed.  Acosta  et  al.  (2008)  find  that  remittances  reduce  income  inequality  in  Haiti, 
Guatemala, El Salvador, Nicaragua, and Honduras; have a negligible effect in Bolivia, Ecuador, 
Paraguay  and  Peru;  and  increase  inequality  in  Dominican  Republic  and  Mexico.  In  the 
Colombian case the anecdotal evidence suggests that migration is expensive so households at 
the  lower  end  of  the  income  distribution  cannot  afford  it.  This  means  that  low  income 
households  have  fewer  chances  of  benefiting  from  international  migration,  and  then,  from 
remittances. 
 
But to be able to say something conclusive on the subject we need additional calculations. To 
study changes in income distribution we present and contrast two approaches. We start with an 
accounting approach where we assume that income without remittances would have been equal 
to the current income minus the amount of remittances reported (for those households with 
remittances). In the alternative counterfactual approach, we use estimated income (from the 
matching estimates) in order to infer the income households would have had without migration 
and/or remittances.  
 
a.  Accounting Approach 
 
Table 6 shows some basic information regarding the distribution of total annual remittances.
7 
The panel on the left classifies households that receive remittances by income quintile, where 
the income quintile is that in which households receiving remittances are located once we order 
all households (receiving and not receiving remittances) according to their per capita income 
without remittances. According to this criterion, households that receive remittances are more 
likely to belong to the bottom and top quintiles (49 percent and 29 percent, respectively). The 
table also has information about the distribution of remittances. Households in the first quintile of 
the  income  (without  remittances)  distribution  receive  16.3  percent  of  remittances,  while 
households in the top quintile receive 45.4 percent of remittances.  
 
The second panel classifies households into quintiles but now using total per capita income 
(including remittances). In this case, 41.3 percent of households receiving remittances belong to 
the bottom quintile. Interestingly, 61.3 percent of the remittances are received by households in 
the top quintile of the income (with remittances) distribution. This means that when remittances 
are included in the definition of income, fewer households receiving remittances belong to the 
bottom quintile, and more remittances go to the top quintile.   
 
Table 6. Households and remittances distributions using total and accounting income. 
Households receiving remittances  
 
Quintile  Income quintile organised by: 
Income without remittances  Income with remittances  Difference 
Households  Remittances  Households  Remittances  Households  Remittances 
N  %  $ Ml  %  N  %  $ Ml  %  N  %  $ Ml  % 
1  42.1  49.0  8.3  16.3  35.5  41.3  4.1  8.1  -6.6  -7.7  -4.2  -8.2 
2  9.0  10.4  11.0  21.5  11.3  13.1  5.4  10.5  2.3  2.7  -5.6  -11.0 
3  3.4  3.9  2.1  4.0  5.7  6.6  4.5  8.9  2.3  2.7  2.5  4.8 
4  6.4  7.5  6.6  12.8  7.2  8.4  5.7  11.2  0.8  0.9  -0.8  -1.6 
5  25.1  29.2  23.2  45.4  26.3  30.6  31.4  61.3  1.2  1.4  8.2  15.9 
Total   85.9  100.0  51.1  100.0  85.9  14.5  51.1  100.0  0  0  0  0 
CC  -0.170  0.198  0.088  0.359   
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To quantify the redistributive effect of remittances we calculate the Gini coefficient before and 
after remittances. Figure 5 helps us to understand this exercise. Each point in the figure shows 
the share of income (in the vertical axis) accruing to a corresponding share of population (in the 
horizontal axis). The closer the curve to the diagonal line, the more egalitarian is the distribution 
of income in the population.  
 
Figure 5. Distribution of Remittances and their Effect on Income Distribution 
         Accounting Approach                             Counterfactual Approach 
   
 
 
The dashed curve illustrates the distribution of income without remittances, our baseline income 
distribution according to the accounting approach. Twice the area between that curve and the 
diagonal is what is defined as the Gini coefficient of income before remittances. The solid line 
shows the distribution of remittances. The line depicts what we already know from table 6: the 
poorest 20 (60) percent of the households receive about 16 (42) percent of total remittances. 
 
Once  we  add  remittances  to  the  income  without  remittances,  and  maintain  the  order  of 
households according to the income without  remittances, we get the dotted curve,  which is 
closer  to  the  diagonal.  This  illustrates  the  gains  in  progressivity  with  respect  to  the  initial 
distribution of income. However, changes in the income distribution shown in figure 5 are very 
small  due  to  the  fact  that  although  remittances  are  very  important  for  their  beneficiary 
households, they are only received by a small share of households, thus having a small impact 
on income distribution when adopting the accounting approach. 
 
In sum, we use two definitions of income: (i) income without remittances (our baseline income) 
and (ii) income with remittances. We use two criteria for ordering households: (i) according to 
their per capita income without remittances, and (ii) according to their per capita income with 
remittances.  Households  must  be  ordered  according  to  their  per  capita  income  without 
remittances when we want to calculate the baseline Gini coefficient, and with remittances when 
we want to calculate the final Gini coefficient.  
 
We follow Kakwani (1977 and 1984) to estimate the concentration coefficient of remittances, a 
concept which is similar to that of the Gini coefficient, and tells us whether remittances are 
received proportionally more by the poor or the rich. To estimate the concentration coefficient, 
we perform a similar calculation to that made to estimate the Gini coefficient, but in this case, 
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income  without  remittances.
8  Positive  values  of  this  coefficient  imply  that  on  average 
remittances are regressive and negative values imply that they are on average progressive. Our 
estimate  of  the  concentration  coefficient  of  remittances  is  0.198  (see  last  row  in  table  6), 
meaning they are on average more likely to be received by the rich. However, this value is lower 
than the Gini coefficient without remittances (0.3676), meaning the remittances are considerably 
less regressive than the other sources of income. 
 
Then we estimate the concentration coefficient of income with remittances maintaining the order 
households had according to their per capita income without remittances. If remittances are less 
concentrated than other sources of income, then the concentration coefficient of income with 
remittances  must  be  smaller  than  the  Gini  coefficient.  This  is  indeed  what  happens:  The 
concentration coefficient obtained once we include remittances in household‟s income, keeping 
the order they had without remittances, is 0.3661. Here again, the gain in distribution is small 
due to the small share of households receiving remittances. 
 
Remittances  are  equitable  according  to  the  vertical  criteria  whenever  there  are  more 
remittances  received  by  individuals  in  the  lowest  percentiles  of  the  income  distribution. 
Nonetheless,  if  the  amount  is  considerably  large,  recipients  can  become  richer  than  other 
households  that  were  richer  than  them  before  receiving  remittances.  In  this  case,  a 
phenomenon known as horizontal inequity (in the targeting of remittances) arises. Note that if 
there were no horizontal inequities in the assignment of remittances, income with remittances 
would be already ordered in per capita terms, and thus the concentration coefficient of income 
with remittances would actually be the Gini coefficient of income with remittances. 
 
However, the amount of remittances received by households is of an important magnitude so it 
is very likely that remittances involve large horizontal inequities. For example, per capita income 
without remittances over all households is less than $310,000, and with remittances is slightly 
below $350,000. Once we order households according to their income with remittances, we find 
that the final Gini coefficient is 0.3670, slightly smaller than the initial coefficient. 
 
Although the accounting approach is very useful to give insights about the magnitude of the 
distributive  effects  of  remittances,  it  has  several  limitations  that  prevent  it  from  accurately 
capturing what actually happens to households with either migration experience or receiving 
remittances. The key assumption is that income without the effect of remittances is just the total 
income of households minus their remittances. This means that no household ends up with 
lower income than the income it had without remittances. But there is no reason to impose ex 
ante the condition that income (without remittances) remains the same, regardless of whether 
the household receives remittances or not. In the case of households with migration experience 
and remittances this assumption implies that the contribution of the migrant to income was nil. 
 
Although  remittances  can  generally  be  higher  than  the  migrant‟s  original  contribution  to 
household income, there is evidence suggesting that this is not always the case. For example, 
Ozden (2006) shows that only 47 percent of Colombians with university degrees living in the 
United  States  have  skilled  jobs.  The  figures  for  Mexico  and  Brazil  are  32  and  51  percent, 
respectively. In addition, Medina and Posso (2009) show that Colombians perform less qualified 
tasks than migrants from most South American countries like Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Uruguay 
and Venezuela.  
 
                                                           
8 A straightforward formulation of the Gini coefficient if we used only information by income quintile would be: G = 
(2/5) * i=1 to 5 i * xi – 1 - 1/5, where xi is the share of income of quintile i, and households are sorted through quintiles 
according to their per capita income, with those with the lowest per capita income in quintile 1. For the concentration 
coefficient the formula is the same, but in this case xi is the share of remittances of quintile i, and households are still 
sorted through quintiles according to their per capita income.   22 
Stakeholders also pointed to the difficulties migrants and their families face when they often 
leave behind their relatives and work in other countries with much lower socioeconomic status, 
at times subject to discrimination and abuses. Under plausible conditions remittances might not 
always be enough to compensate the migrant‟s household income before migrating. In other 
words, households with migration experience and remittances can experience a net income 
loss.  
 
The previous discussion suggests the need to introduce the counterfactual approach, which 
allows us to simulate the earnings migrants would have had if they had not migrated. This is 
essential  in  order  to  assess  the  distribution  of  income  before  and  after  migration  and 
remittances. 
 
b.  Counterfactual Approach 
 
The migrants‟ counterfactual income is the income a household would have had if it had not 
experienced migration. This approach is in the spirit of those undertaken by Adams (1989), 
Barham  and  Boucher (1998),  and  Acosta  et  al.  (2008),  which  estimated  migrant‟s  earnings 
without remittances based on a set of their characteristics and compare the distribution of that 
income with and without migration experience. Rather than replicating their exercise, we take 
advantage of the matching estimates of migration experience and remittances discussed above. 
Specifically, we estimate income for each household as a weighted average of the income of a 




As  shown  in  Figure  5,  households  at  the  bottom  40  percent  of  the  counterfactual  income 
distribution do not receive remittances; while according to the accounting approach, households 
at  the  bottom  40  percent  of the  income  distribution  receive  approximately  37  percent  of  all 
remittances (see Table 7). This means that by subtracting remittances from observed income 
we  underestimate  the  income  households  would  have  had  if  they  were  not  receiving 
remittances. From the distributional viewpoint this implies that the share of poor households that 
are beneficiaries of remittances is overestimated in the accounting approach.  
 
Table 7. Households and remittances distributions using counterfactual and accounting income. 
Households receiving remittances  
 
Quintile  Income quintile organised by: 
Income without remittances  Counterfactual income  Difference 
Households  Remittances  Households  Remittances  Households  Remittances 
N  %  $ Ml  %  N  %  $ Ml  %  N  %  $ Ml  % 
1  42.1  49.0  8.3  16.3  12.5  14.5  0.6  1.2  -29.6  -34.4  -7.7  -15.0 
2  9.0  10.4  11.0  21.5  12.5  14.5  0.6  1.2  3.5  4.1  -10.4  -20.3 
3  3.4  3.9  2.1  4.0  16.5  19.3  7.6  14.9  13.2  15.3  5.6  10.9 
4  6.4  7.5  6.6  12.8  32.3  37.6  36.7  71.8  25.9  30.1  30.2  59.0 
5  25.1  29.2  23.2  45.4  12.1  14.0  5.5  10.8  -13.0  -15.1  -17.7  -34.6 
Total   85.9  100.0  51.1  100.0  85.9  14.5  51.1  100.0  0  0  0  0 
CC  -0.170  0.198  0.088  0.359   
 
Table 7 compares the distribution of households and total annual remittances per quintiles of 
the population according to the accounting and counterfactual approaches. According to the 
counterfactual approach, remittances are received mostly by households at the top 60 percent 
of  the  income  distribution,  implying  greater  concentration  than  what  the  simple  accounting 
                                                           
9 Notice that in this section we have to rely on the more restrictive assumption explained above, according to which 
Y0  D|X, rather than on the less restrictive one related to the average E(Y0| D=1, X) = E(Y0| D=0, X).   23 
approach  suggests.  In  fact,  the  concentration  coefficient  of  remittances  is  0.198  using  the 
accounting approach and 0.359 measuring income with the counterfactual approach. Table 8 
shows  how  remittances  change  the  income  distribution  according  to  the  counterfactual 
approach. In net, 16.6 percent of households move to the top 20 percent of the distribution after 
remittances.  Under  this  approach,  inequality  actually  increases  due  to  remittances, from  an 
initial Gini coefficient of 0.3638 to a final of 0.3821. 
 
Table 8. Households and remittances distributions using counterfactual and total income. 
Households receiving remittances  
 
Quintile  Income quintile organised by: 
Counterfactual income  Income with remittances  Difference 
Households  Remittances  Households  Remittances  Households  Remittances 
N  %  $ Ml  %  N  %  $ Ml  %  N  %  $ Ml  % 
1  25.0  29.1  1.3  2.5  35.5  41.3  4.1  8.1  23.0  26.7  3.5  6.9 
2  11.3  13.1  5.4  10.5  -1.2  -1.4  4.7  9.3 
3  16.5  19.3  7.6  14.9  5.7  6.6  4.5  8.9  -10.9  -12.7  -3.1  -6.1 
4  32.3  37.6  36.7  71.8  7.2  8.4  5.7  11.2  -25.1  -29.2  -31.0  -60.6 
5  12.1  14.0  5.5  10.8  26.3  30.6  31.4  61.3  14.2  16.6  25.8  50.5 
Total   85.9  100  51.5  100  85.9  100  51.1  100  0  0  0  0 
CC  0.088  0.359  -0.104  0.429   
 
Figure  6  shows  the  results  of  assessing  the  effects  of  migration  experience  on  income 
distribution. It shows the distribution of counterfactual income which is the income households 
with migration experience would have had if they had not experienced migration. In this case, 
that  Gini  coefficient  is  0.3780,  the  concentration  coefficient  of  remittances  is  0.4849,  the 
concentration coefficient of income with remittances is 0.3713, and finally, the Gini coefficient of 
the  income  with  remittances  is  0.3812,  actually  larger than  the  one  households  had  before 




Figure 6. Effect on Income Distribution of Migration Experience 
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Figure  7  illustrates  the  distribution  of  gains  from  migration  experience  (on  the  left)  and 
remittances (on the right). Although the expected gain is positive in both cases, there are risks 
too (associated with the possible loss of up to 100 percent the counterfactual income). This 
means that a risk averse individual who knows this distribution in advance, would only be willing 
to migrate if the expected gain is large (which is more likely to occur for individuals at the very 
bottom of the income distribution).  
 




In sum, both migration experience and remittances involve a risky decision from the part of the 
households. After such decisions there are winners and losers, with a net gain in both cases 
that increases inequality. 
 
 
3.4  Impacts on poverty 
 
We estimate the impacts of migration and remittances on the probability of households being 
under the poverty line using several different poverty measures: the US 1-dollar and 2-dollar per 
day lines (adjusted by purchasing power parity (PPP)), and the national extreme poverty and 
poverty  lines.
10  Figure  8  illustrates  the  distribution  of  household  income  before  and  after 
                                                           
10 By December 2008 the one and two dollar per day lines were equivalent to $37,400 and $74,800 monthly per 
person respectively, while the extreme poverty and poverty lines were $116,292 and $264,026 monthly per person. 
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remittances,  and  it  also  depicts  the  distribution  of  the  counterfactual  income  among  those 
receiving remittances and among those having migration experience. If counterfactual incomes 
were  correctly  describing  the  income  that  households  would  have  had  without  migration 
experience or remittances, according to the figure, since households actually benefiting from 
migration and remittances are likely to have been located just around the poverty line before 
migration, then we should expect both migration experience and remittances to have the largest 
impact on the share of households under the poverty line, rather than those under the extreme 
poverty line or the US$2 and US$1 lines. 
 
   
                                                                                                                                                                                           
person‟s foods needs, and the poverty line also includes the amount required to satisfy other needs like housing, 
clothing, etc.   26 
Figure 8: Distribution of income before and after remittances and poverty lines 
 
 
Source: DOTM Colombian Household Survey (authors‟ calculations) 
 
When we use the one and two-dollars per day lines (adjusting by PPP) and we analyse the 
income households would have  without  remittances,  we find that households with migration 
experience would be between 2.4 and 3.2 per cent more likely to be under the US$1 and US$2 
lines,  respectively.  Once  we  take  remittances  into  account,  households  with  migration 
experience become as likely to be under either of those lines as any other household.  For 
households receiving remittances, we find no effect of remittances on the likelihood to be under 
the US$1 or US$2 lines. 
 
When we use the national extreme poverty line, we find again that households with migration 
experience are more likely (by nearly 7 per cent) to be under the extreme poverty if they are not 
receiving remittances, but as above, they are as likely to be in extreme poverty once we take 
remittances into account. When we examine the group of households receiving remittances we 
find that they are as likely, with or without remittances, to be extremely poor. 
 
A different picture emerges with the national poverty line cut off. In that case, both households 
with migration experience and that receive remittances would be as likely as the others to be 
poor when we consider only their income without remittances, but households with migration 
experience  or  that  receive  remittances  would  now  be  less  likely  to  be  poor  once  we  take 
remittances into account. The estimates indicate that households with an absent migrant would 
be 14 per cent less likely to be poor, while those with a return migrant would be 9 per cent less 
likely to be poor. Households receiving remittances from relatives would be 14 per cent less 
likely to be poor, while on average, those receiving remittances from any source would be 12 
per cent less likely to be poor. Table 9 presents the results of the impact of migration experience 
and remittances on poverty.  
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Table 9: Effects of migration and remittances on poverty 
 
  
ATT  Std. Err.  t  ATT  Std. Err.  t 
Poverty without Remittances (US$ 
1 PPP) 
Extreme Poverty without 
Remittances (Extreme Poverty 
Line) 
ME  0.024  0.015  1.60  0.069  0.034  2.036** 
ME Absent  0.003  0.024  0.12  0.037  0.041  0.88 
ME Returnee  0.023  0.016  1.47  0.045  0.038  1.19 
RR Family  0.027  0.027  1.01  0.062  0.054  1.13 
RR All  0.016  0.027  0.58  0.040  0.051  0.78 
  
Poverty with Remittances (US$1 
PPP) 
Extreme Poverty with Remittances 
(Extreme Poverty Line) 
ME  0.013  0.013  0.96  0.043  0.032  1.35 
ME Absent  -0.013  0.031  -0.41  0.000  0.041  -0.01 
ME Returnee  0.023  0.015  1.52  0.030  0.033  0.89 
RR Family  -0.005  0.013  -0.36  -0.002  0.040  -0.06 
RR All  -0.006  0.034  -0.18  -0.033  0.050  -0.66 
  
Poverty without Remittances (US$ 
2 PPP) 
Poverty without Remittances 
(Poverty Line) 
ME  0.032  0.017  1.925*  -0.010  0.038  -0.26 
ME Absent  0.006  0.032  0.20  -0.078  0.055  -1.42 
ME Returnee  0.033  0.024  1.41  -0.078  0.055  -1.42 
RR Family  0.021  0.021  0.98  -0.058  0.064  -0.90 
RR All  0.017  0.028  0.61  -0.054  0.061  -0.90 
  
Poverty without Remittances (US$2 
PPP) 
Poverty with Remittances (Poverty 
Line) 
ME  0.017  0.017  1.00  -0.044  0.043  -1.02 
ME Absent  -0.014  0.045  -0.32  -0.140  0.050  -2.807** 
ME Returnee  0.026  0.020  1.28  -0.085  0.041  -2.083** 
RR Family  -0.011  0.023  -0.49  -0.143  0.064  -2.243** 
RR All  -0.012  0.027  -0.44  -0.120  0.050  -2.399** 
Source: DOTM Colombian Household Survey (authors‟ calculations) 
 
For each household we use the cut offs previously described to determine whether or not that 
household would be under the poverty or extreme poverty lines. In the case of households 
receiving  remittances  we  make  the  same  calculation  using  their  income  with  and  without 
remittances, which gives an idea of whether households receiving remittances would be under 
the poverty lines if they were not receiving remittances. 
 
These results highlight the importance of migration and remittances in reducing poverty and are 
in line with our interpretation of Figure 8. They also tally with previous estimates by Garay and 
Rodríguez (2005), who find that if remittances are not taken into account in household income, 
poverty  and  extreme  poverty  rates  rise  by  5  percentage  points  in  the  metropolitan  area  of 
Pereira (although by using an accounting approach in their study, Garay and Rodríguez may be 
overestimating the impact of remittances at the lower end of the income distribution). Using the 
2005 Colombian Population Census, Cárdenas and Mejía (2009) show that about 16 per cent of   28 
individuals in Pereira live in households with experience of migration. If we apply our impact 
estimates - no impact for extreme poverty, and 12 per cent for poverty - then remittances would 
only reduce poverty, and they would reduce it by about 1.9 percentage points at the most. 
 
 
3.5  Impacts on savings, homeownership and access to financial services 
 
The results presented in Table 10 show that households with migration experience increase 
their  monthly  total  and  per-capita  savings  by  $34,000  (US$17)  and  $11,000  (US$5.5), 
respectively.  This is mostly due to the effect on households with a return migrant, which is 
about three times the size of the impact in households with an absent migrant. Remittances 
from relatives increase total and per-capita savings by $24,000 (US$12) and $8,000 (US$4) 
respectively; as do remittances from any source. 
 
Owning  a  house  tends  to  be  the  most  important  form  of  savings  for  most  Colombian 
households. Although our cross section estimates show that both migration and remittances 
increase  the  probability  of  owning  a  house,  the  more  accurate  difference-in-differences 
estimates show that migration experience does not have a significant effect, while the effect of 
remittances, although still positive and statistically significant, is smaller than the one found with 
the cross section estimates. Households receiving remittances from a relative are 5 per cent 
more likely to own a house, while households receiving remittances from any source are 4 per 
cent more likely to own a house. 
 
Our survey enables us to know whether any member of the household has an account in a 
financial institution, and whether they had one five years ago. We use this information to assess 
whether migration or remittances increase the probability that a household has an account in a 
financial  institution.  Cross  section  and  difference  in  differences  estimates  of  this  effect  are 
presented in Table 10. Neither our cross section nor our difference-in-differences estimators 
show  any  effect  of  migration  or  remittances  on  the  probability  of  holding  an  account  in  a 
financial institution.  
 
The  next  step  is  assessing  whether  migration  or  remittances  increase  the  likelihood  of 
households having a financial account for the purpose of establishing and running a business. 
The only effect we find is that according to our DD estimates, households receiving remittances 





3.6  Impacts on education  
 
Households  that  receive  remittances  are  less  credit  constrained,  and  are  therefore  able  to 
spend more on human capital formation, such as education and health services. Previous work 
by Medina and Cardona (2005) finds evidence supporting this hypothesis, and also suggesting 
higher enrolment rates in private education for remittance recipients, using data from a survey 
for the metropolitan area of Pereira collected in 2004, and from another LSMS survey at the 
national level collected in 2003. Cárdenas and Mejía (2009) cite additional evidence of positive 
effects in other Latin American countries, although there is important heterogeneity in the results 
across countries. The reduction in child labour is another channel through which remittances 
might affect human capital accumulation, increasing school attendance and performance, as 
found by Mansuri (2006). 
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ATT  Std. Err.  t  ATT  Std. Err.  t 
Savings of Hhold 
(Colombian pesos) 
Hhold with Account in Financial 
Institution 
ME  34,010  12,316  2.761**  0.015  0.033  0.45 
ME Absent  16,754  8,689  1.928*  0.018  0.047  0.37 
ME Returnee  50,183  25,878  1.939*  0.032  0.034  0.94 
RR Family  23,721  11,321  2.095**  0.021  0.054  0.39 




Hhold with Account in Financial 
Institution (DD) 
ME  10,975  5,193  2.113**  -0.011  0.021  -0.55 
ME Absent  5,879  2,819  2.086**  0.005  0.036  0.15 
ME Returnee  15,566  9,570  1.63  -0.030  0.029  -1.02 
RR Family  8,253  3,285  2.512**  0.041  0.036  1.13 
RR All  7,508  4,056  1.851*  0.017  0.030  0.56 
  
Hhold Owns Housing  Hhold with Account for Credit to 
Fund Business 
ME  0.090  0.028  3.259**  0.027  0.015  1.811* 
ME Absent  0.108  0.033  3.242**  0.014  0.014  1.03 
ME Returnee  0.087  0.037  2.372**  0.035  0.019  1.862* 
RR Family  0.157  0.033  4.729**  0.030  0.019  1.56 
RR All  0.136  0.042  3.262**  0.035  0.017  2.06** 
  
Hhold Owns Housing (DD)  Hhold with Account for Credit to 
Fund Business (DD) 
ME  0.015  0.021  0.72  0.003  0.018  0.19 
ME Absent  0.038  0.026  1.46  -0.001  0.022  -0.05 
ME Returnee  0.001  0.021  0.06  -0.002  0.027  -0.06 
RR Family  0.049  0.023  2.173**  0.013  0.023  0.54 
RR All  0.036  0.022  1.61  0.045  0.026  1.687* 
Source: DOTM Colombian Household Survey (authors‟ calculations) 
 
Similarly,  Cox-Edwards  and  Ureta  (2003)  find  that  remittances  reduce  the  probability  of 
dropping out of the school to a larger extent than labour income growth in El Salvador, while 
Yang (2003) estimates that a 10 per cent increase in remittances leads to an increase of just 
over 10 per cent in the enrolment rates of students between 17 and 21 years of age in the 
Philippines. 
 
However, as pointed by Katseli et al. (2006) and the World Bank (2006), migration alters family 
composition and means that children often grow up in single parent households, which can 
potentially have a negative effect on their school performance.  
 
Migration might also affect school performance by changing children‟s expectations, depending 
on whether the migrant needed to have high levels of education or not in order to migrate, and 
have „successful‟ experiences abroad. For example, Cárdenas and Mejía (2008) suggest that in   30 
the case of Mexico, the successful experience of unskilled migrants might encourage younger 
individuals to prefer migrating than studying. 
 
Finally,  households  with  returned  migrants  -  who  may  have  a  higher  level  of  educational 
attainment and may also bring with them savings that could allow them to work less and spend 
more  time  at home with their children  -  might be expected to  present better education and 
health indicators. 
 
Monthly total and per-capita expenditure on secondary and higher education 
 
To  assess  the  overall  impact  of  migration  and  remittances  on  the  monthly  expenditures  of 
households on education, we first estimate their effects on the sub-sample of households with at 
least one member between 6 to 18 years old, which allows us to look at impacts on primary and 
secondary  education  expenditure.  Since  we  do  not  have  enough  households  in  our  survey 
sample to perform the same exercise for households with members 19 to 25, we repeat the 
exercise for households with members aged 6 to 25. The estimation for that sub-sample of 
households would give us an insight into the effects on expenditure on primary, secondary and 
higher education. 
 
Table 11 shows the results of these two estimations. The panel at the top shows the results for 
households with at least one member between 6 to 18 years old, and the second panel shows 
them for households with at least one member aged between 6 to 25 years. 
 
In the results for households with at least one member aged between 6 to 18 years, we find that 
households with return migrants spend nearly $40,000 more on education, but do not find any 
other significant effect. For households with at least one member aged between 6 to 25 years, 
we find again a positive effect of migration, mostly in households with return migrants. The 
results  show  that  households  with  experience  of  migration  spend  about  $34,000  more  per 
month  on  education,  while  households  receiving  remittances  spend  between  $59,000  and 
$77,000 more per month on education.   31 
Table 11: Educational factors 
 
  
ATT  Std. Err.  t  ATT 
Std. 
Err.  t  ATT  Std. Err.  t 
Basic Education Expenditure 
(Colombian Pesos) 
Per-capita Basic and Higher 
Education Expenditure 
(Colombian Pesos) 
School Attendance (All) 
ME  10,775  12,347  0.87  10,102  5,145  1.963**  -0.036  0.030  -1.20 
ME Absent  11,579  10,164  1.14  16,289  7,823  2.082**  0.005  0.040  0.12 
ME Returnee  39,036  14,628  2.669**  9,375  4,998  1.876*  0.001  0.046  0.02 
RR Family  10,424  14,158  0.74  26,159  9,568  2.734**  0.010  0.039  0.25 
RR All  3,476  12,338  0.28  21,746  10,460  2.079**  -0.030  0.036  -0.84 
  
Basic and Higher Education 
Expenditure 
(Colombian Pesos) 
% of Children Between 6 and 
18 Years Attending School  School Attendance (Males) 
ME  33,785  18,116  1.865*  -0.028  0  -1.02  -0.027  0.037  -0.74 
ME Absent  45,737  32,085  1.43  -0.006  0  -0.27  0.035  0.048  0.74 
ME Returnee  43,855  24,230  1.81*  -0.035  0  -1.32  -0.015  0.052  -0.28 
RR Family  76,980  32,865  2.342**  -0.047  0  -1.13  0.010  0.054  0.18 
RR All  59,130  29,713  1.99**  -0.048  0  -1.23  0.008  0.051  0.16 
  
Per-capita Basic Education 
Expenditure 
(Colombian Pesos) 
% of Children Between 6 and 
25 Years Attending School 
School Attendance 
(Women) 
ME  3,009  3,230  0.93  -0.019  0  -0.61  -0.040  0.043  -0.95 
ME Absent  4,342  3,064  1.42  0.006  0  0.17  -0.013  0.055  -0.23 
ME Returnee  10,299  6,167  1.67*  -0.019  0  -0.51  -0.058  0.057  -1.02 
RR Family  2,090  3,017  0.69  0.027  0  0.54  -0.012  0.063  -0.19 
RR All  -239  2,801  -0.09  -0.001  0  -0.02  -0.011  0.047  -0.23 
Source: DOTM Colombian Household Survey (authors‟ calculations) 
 
When we use per-capita expenditure rather than total expenditure on education, we again find a 
positive effect in households with return migrants, but do not find any other significant effect on 
expenditure on basic education, and again, a positive and significant effect on basic and higher 
education  expenditure  for  both  migration  experience  and  remittances.  Migration  experience 
increases per-capita expenditure on basic and higher education by $10,000 per month (slightly 
more  in  households  with  absentees),  while  remittances  increase  it  between  $22,000  and 
$26,000 per month. This magnitude is just about one third that of total educational expenditure, 
a  figure,  it  is  worth  noting,  which  is  consistent  with  the  size  of  households  with  migration 




We also assess the impact of migration and remittances on school attendance for households 
with members aged 6 to 18 and with members aged 6 to 25. First, we do it at the household 
level by creating a variable equal to the share of individuals in the household in a specific age 
range (6-18 or 6-25) that attend school; and then we do it at the individual level for all individuals 
in those age ranges, and separately for males and females. We find no significant effect of 
migration experience, or remittances from any source, on school attendance in any of these 
analyses.   32 
3.7  Impacts on health  
 
Migration might affect health outcomes directly through remittances by enabling households to 
demand  more  and  better  health  services,  just  as  they  do  for  education.  As  Hildebrant  and 
McKenzie (2005) point out, migration may also give individuals and households knowledge and 
experience of foreign health habits and practices that could foster healthier behaviours at home. 
Nonetheless, they also note that by raising the opportunity costs of time for parents, migration 
might reduce breastfeeding and the application of vaccines in a timely fashion.
11 
 
Total and per-capita health expenditure and health perception 
 
Table 12 presents the matching estimates of the effect of migration experience and remittances 
on total and per-capita health expenditure. Migration experience has a positive effect on total 
health expenditure per month of nearly $29,000, mostly driven by the effect on households with 
return migrants, while remittances from any source increases total health expenditure by nearly 
$49,000 per month. The impact of migration on per-capita health expenditure is $7,000 per 
month, and that of remittances is around $11,000 per month. Finally, we found no overall effect 
of migration experience on people‟s perception of their health, but only a negative effect on 
individuals living in a household with an absent migrant: they are almost 4 per cent less likely to 
perceive that their health is good.  
 
As  shown  in  the  table,  this  result  is  explained  by  the  answers  given  by  female  survey 
respondents, who are almost 5 per cent less likely to perceive that their health is good. A similar 
result is found for households receiving remittances: their recipients are between 4-6 per cent 
less likely to perceive they have good health, where again, females are driving this result, since 
females in households receiving remittances are between 5-8 per cent less likely to perceive 
they have good health. This negative result for females might be linked to emotional distress 
caused by the absence of migrants, which may have knock-on impacts for their physical health. 
As some stakeholders observed, members of sender households can suffer from emotional 
problems if they are concerned about the welfare of their relatives abroad (especially those who 
may have migrated illegally). Similarly, living in a situation of family fragmentation might also 
have an impact on the household members‟ health status. 
                                                           
11 Further evidence is also presented in Cárdenas and Mejía (2009).   33 
Table 12:  Health factors 
 
   ATT  Std. Err.  t 
Health Expenditure of Hhold (Colombian pesos) 
ME  28,572  14,331  1.994** 
ME Absent  18,272  17,035  1.07 
ME Returnee  56,691  20,871  2.716** 
RR Family  53,825  33,726  1.60 
RR All  49,120  22,818  2.153** 
Per-capita Health Expenditure (Colombian pesos) 
ME  7,435  2,835  2.622** 
ME Absent  2,986  3,840  0.78 
ME Returnee  13,289  4,711  2.821** 
RR Family  11,357  4,739  2.396** 
RR All  11,570  4,527  2.555** 
Good health (All) 
ME  -0.023  0.017  -1.35 
ME Absent  -0.039  0.017  -2.327** 
ME Returnee  0.009  0.019  0.48 
RR Family  -0.058  0.020  -2.882** 
RR All  -0.046  0.016  -2.895** 
Good health (Males) 
ME  -0.016  0.021  -0.77 
ME Absent  -0.025  0.021  -1.17 
ME Returnee  0.018  0.023  0.78 
RR Family  -0.030  0.027  -1.10 
RR All  -0.029  0.026  -1.15 
Good health (Females) 
ME  -0.032  0.019  -1.662* 
ME Absent  -0.048  0.019  -2.527** 
ME Returnee  0.006  0.026  0.25 
RR Family  -0.073  0.026  -2.785** 
RR All  -0.056  0.022  -2.504** 
Source: DOTM Colombian Household Survey (authors‟ calculations) 
 
3.8  Impacts on quality of life and living standards 
 
Measuring quality of life usually requires a comprehensive examination of living standards and 
habits, and trying to measure differences in these standards between migrant and non migrant 
households, which is not an easy task. In addition, there are multiple dimensions which have an 
important impact on the quality of life but are very difficult to account for, such as the influence 
of social networks.  
   34 
The  life  satisfaction  approach  provides  a  relatively  simple  way  to  measure  quality  of  life.
12 
Following this type of research, our  survey included the following question: “Considering all 
aspects,  how  satisfied  are  you  with  your  life  currently?  Use  a  1  to  10  scale,  where  1  is 
unsatisfied and 10 is satisfied.” To assess the effect of migration experience and remittances on 
life  satisfaction,  we  define  three  dummy  variables  (these  take  a  value  of  one  when:  (i)  the 
individual answered 6 or more, (ii) the answer was 8 or more; (iii) the answer was 3 or less). 
These three variables indicate whether individuals are on average satisfied, if they are very 
satisfied or very unsatisfied respectively, with their lives. 
 
Table 13 shows the results of our matching estimates. Migration experience makes individuals 
just over 6 per cent more likely to feel very satisfied (if they answered 8 or more in our life 
satisfaction  question)  mainly  due  to  its  positive  effect  on  women  living  in  households  with 
returned migrants, while remittances from relatives make their beneficiaries between 9-11 per 
cent  more  likely  to  feel  very  satisfied,  here  again,  due  to  their  effect  on  women.  Neither 
migration  experience  nor  remittances  have  an effect  on  the  whole  population‟s  average  life 
satisfaction (answering 6 or more) or dissatisfaction (answering 3 or less), although men living 
in households with an absent migrant are about 4 per cent more likely to feel not satisfied. 
 
Table 13: Life satisfaction 
 
   Males and Females  Males  Females 
   ATT  t  ATT  t  ATT  t 
Average Overall Life Satisfaction of Household (6-10) 
ME  -0.027  -1.05  -0.019  -0.49  -0.034  -1.28 
ME Absent  -0.007  -0.30  -0.023  -0.56  -0.002  -0.06 
ME Returnee  -0.032  -0.94  -0.012  -0.25  -0.058  -1.39 
RR Family  -0.007  -0.17  0.002  0.03  -0.010  -0.20 
RR All  -0.019  -0.52  0.022  0.39  -0.035  -0.90 
Household Very Satisfied (8-10) 
ME  0.063  2.00**  0.046  0.66  0.069  1.51 
ME Absent  0.074  1.77*  -0.032  -0.37  0.078  1.54 
ME Returnee  0.077  2.30**  0.052  0.88  0.090  1.89* 
RR Family  0.113  2.73**  0.125  1.37  0.108  2.21** 
RR All  0.051  1.34  0.076  0.97  0.044  0.82 
Household Not Satisfied (1-3) 
ME  0.020  1.39  0.031  2.03**  0.016  0.88 
ME Absent  0.010  0.64  0.041  1.66*  -0.002  -0.09 
ME Returnee  0.021  1.21  0.023  1.26  0.025  1.10 
RR Family  -0.014  -0.63  0.015  0.59  -0.033  -0.88 
RR All  0.002  0.16  0.009  0.58  -0.003  -0.17 
Source: DOTM Colombian Household Survey (authors‟ calculations) 
 
 
                                                           
12 This approach has now been widely applied, as documented in Frey and Stutzer (2002) and van Praag (2007), 
among others. Applications in which the approach is used to value public goods have become common, as it has 
been shown by Frey et al. (2004). For the foundations of the approach, see Layard (2005), which presents evidence 
from  the  neuroscience  supporting  the  fact  that  this  apparently  subjective  method  actually  has  strong  objective 
grounds.   35 
3.9  Impacts on household structure and gender roles 
 
All  interviewed  stakeholders  agree  that  international  migration  has  had  an  impact  on family 
structure in Colombia. They claim that since the largest migratory wave is very recent, only 
some members of the core (or nuclear) family are likely to have left the country, thereby directly 





We define the variable „core family‟, which is equal to one when the household members include 
both parents and at least one child (in the case of a widowed parent the variable is also one). 
Whenever the absent migrant is the spouse of a household member or is the parent of a child in 
the household, the value is zero. 
 
Table 14 presents the results of this exercise. Households with migration experience are around 
8 per cent less likely to keep their core family together, and interestingly enough, households 
with return migrants are even less likely (just over 10 per cent) to keep it together. This result 
suggests that some people who return are in a situation in which it is even more difficult to keep 
their  core  family  together  than  households  who  have  an  absent  migrant.  This  finding  is 
discouraging for those who believe that the separation brought about by international migration 
is only temporary. It may well be that the longer the period of separation due to migration, the 
more difficult it can be for the core family to reunite later on. 
 
Households receiving remittances also appear to be more likely to have their core families split, 
particularly when these are sent by relatives; although this is less surprising since several of the 
households receiving remittances from relatives are actually receiving them from a member of 
the core family. We extend the results in order to look at the situation of family fragmentation 
ignoring information that is available from the survey in the case of households with migration 
experience (which complete a more detailed questionnaire). In this case, which we label core 
family*,  we  again  find  negative  effects  of  both  migration  experience  and  remittances,  even 
though they are of smaller magnitude, and not significant in the specific cases of households 
with either absent or return migrants, and for households receiving remittances from any source. 
These  results  give  additional  support  to  the  conclusion  that  both  migration  experience  and 
remittances cause family fragmentation, though perhaps not to the extent that might have been 
expected by stakeholders. 
 
Table 14: Family structure 
 
Core Family 
   ATT  t 
ME  -0.079  -3.768** 
ME Absent  -0.071  -1.777* 
ME Returnee  -0.103  -3.121** 
RR Family  -0.146  -3.554** 
RR All  -0.061  -2.172** 
Core Family
* 
   ATT  t 
ME  -0.060  -2.854** 
ME Absent  -0.018  -0.46 
ME Returnee  -0.049  -1.46 
RR Family  -0.108  -3.378**   36 
RR All  -0.044  -1.52 
 




As pointed out by Katseli et al. (2006), the effects of migration depend on who migrates in the 
household. If a male household head migrates, then migration might empower females if they 
take over household decisions and responsibilities. Equally, if the migrant is a woman, migration 
to a more developed country may offer them more equal opportunities in terms of education, 
work positions, and potentially, in terms of cultural acceptance and openness.  
 
Now  we  assess  the  effect  of  migration  and  remittances,  by  gender,  on  the  type  of  tasks 
performed by household‟s members.  The results are presented in Table 15. The activities we 
assess  are  cooking,  cleaning  house,  home  restoration,  water  collection, firewood  collection, 
growing or collecting crops, purchases for household, child care, taking care of the ill or retired, 
resting or recreation, attending social commitments, community work and other activities. We 
find significant effects of migration experience or remittances on cooking, cleaning house, child 
care, attending social commitments and other activities.   37 
Table 15: Tasks performed by men, women, and both genders 
 
   Males and Females  Females  Males 
   ATT  t  ATT  t  ATT  t 
   Cooking 
ME  -0.001  -0.06  -0.017  -0.64  0.022  1.799* 
ME Absent  -0.005  -0.31  -0.025  -1.06  0.007  0.46 
ME Returnee  -0.011  -0.62  -0.046  -1.41  0.023  1.30 
RR Family  -0.005  -0.19  -0.038  -1.18  0.006  0.41 
RR All  0.000  0.02  -0.035  -1.36  0.018  1.44 
   Cleaning Housing 
ME  -0.043  -2.605**  -0.055  -2.588**  -0.022  -1.18 
ME Absent  -0.044  -2.59**  -0.057  -2.369**  -0.039  -1.54 
ME Returnee  -0.048  -2.228**  -0.082  -2.698**  -0.013  -0.48 
RR Family  -0.039  -1.49  -0.051  -1.781*  -0.050  -2.443** 
RR All  -0.022  -1.11  -0.042  -1.54  -0.023  -0.97 
   Child Care 
ME  0.007  0.41  0.020  0.84  -0.011  -0.31 
ME Absent  -0.005  -0.41  -0.007  -0.69  -0.005  -0.31 
ME Returnee  0.035  2.767**  0.030  1.892*  0.040  1.858* 
RR Family  -0.035  -1.664*  -0.033  -1.61  -0.046  -1.30 
RR All  -0.020  -1.03  -0.023  -1.06  -0.027  -0.88 
   Attending Social Commitments 
ME  -0.010  -0.71  -0.018  -1.06  -0.002  -0.10 
ME Absent  -0.001  -0.09  -0.011  -0.67  0.015  0.63 
ME Returnee  0.004  0.20  0.005  0.28  0.010  0.31 
RR Family  0.026  1.42  -0.004  -0.17  0.069  2.084** 
RR All  0.024  1.722*  0.006  0.36  0.056  1.957** 
   Other Activity 
ME  -0.015  -1.32  -0.022  -1.26  -0.008  -0.55 
ME Absent  -0.029  -2.919**  -0.044  -4.205**  -0.012  -0.71 
ME Returnee  -0.006  -0.52  -0.012  -0.80  0.000  0.02 
RR Family  -0.039  -2.806**  -0.049  -3.662**  -0.021  -0.98 
RR All  -0.028  -2.734**  -0.039  -2.653**  -0.014  -0.80 
Source: DOTM Colombian Household Survey (authors‟ calculations) 
 
As shown above, males with migration experience are more likely to spend more time cooking, 
and the magnitude and significance of the estimates suggests than those that spend more time 
cooking are return migrants. This seems reasonable, since it is likely that their experiences 
while abroad (where they are often living alone), encourage them to engage in activities like 
cooking. 
 
Females living in households with migration experience are less likely to spend time cleaning 
the house, which implies that their attitude towards this activity changes while migrants are 
abroad, and persists once they return. Males and females receiving remittances from relatives 
also report being less likely to spend time cleaning the house. 
 
Both males and females living in a household with return migrants spend more time taking care 
of children, although those living in a household that receives remittances spend less time. To 
further  explore  this  result  we  perform  a  more  detailed  study  of  household  structures.  We 
estimate again the propensity score but now we include two additional dummy variables. One is 
equal to one if there are children aged 0 to 12 and members aged between 20 and 30 years old,   38 
and zero otherwise; the other is equal to one if there are children aged 0 to 12 and members 
aged 30 or older. We get estimates for the whole sample of households, and also conditioning 
only to households with children 0 to 12. The results are presented in Table 16.  
 
Table 16: Adults with children in the household 
 
   Migration Experience  Remittances 
   All  Absent  Returnee  Family  All 
Unrestricted 
Children 0-12 * Members 
20-30  -7.46E-06  0.0079  -0.0002  0.0051  0.0282 
   0.000  1.36  -0.04  2.36**  2.08** 
Children 0-12 * Members 
30+  -0.013  -0.0084  -0.0088  -0.0032  -0.0212 
   -1.490  -1.58  -1.57  -1.98**  -1.81* 
Restricted to Households with Children 0-12 
Children 0-12 * Members 
20-30  0.0135  0.0119  2.23E-04  8.67E-08  3.51E-07 
   1.6  2.72**  0.29  3.62**  3.08** 
Children 0-12 * Members 
30+  0.0036  0.0042  -6.32E-04  8.12E-09  4.30E-08 
   0.3  0.86  -0.48  1.31  0.74 
Source: DOTM Colombian Household Survey (authors‟ calculations) 
 
In both the unrestricted and the restricted estimations we find that there are more members 
aged 20 to 30 in the households that receive remittances, but only in the unrestricted estimation 
we find that there are more members 30 and older. If household members aged between 20 
and 30 are relatively less likely to take care of children than engage in other activities - even if 
members aged 30 and older are equally likely to take care of children in households receiving 
remittances and those that do not - the differences found in the demographics of household 
might be enough to explain the negative sign found in child care for households that receive 
remittances. Note also that we found previously that households with migration experience and 
those that receive remittances spend more on education, and in particular, on higher education. 
Thus, education might be among the activities that 20 to 30 years old get involved in and that 
compete with child care. 
 
Migration experience does not affect the likelihood of attending social commitments for either 
males or females, but males receiving remittances are more likely to attend social commitments. 
Finally, both households with an absent migrant and those that receive remittances are less 
likely to spend time on other activities. 
 
 
3.10  Summary of impacts 
 
It appears that the set of households that gain the most from migration and remittances are 
those  with  return  migrants.  Although  their  income  does  not  increase,  their  total  levels  of 
expenditure,  and  specifically  their  expenditures  on  home  products,  recreation,  health  and 
education (both basic and higher, being the only group with migration experience that increases 
its expenditure on basic education) do increase. This might be the result of savings that they 
bring back when they return home, which is consistent with their higher savings and expenditure 
levels,  income  levels  remain  comparable  to  households  without  migration  experience.  Their   39 
poverty levels, considering only their income without remittances, does not seem to be affected 
by their status as return migrants, but once we consider the remittances they receive, their 
likelihood of being in poverty is reduced. They are more likely to feel very satisfied with their life, 
and spend more time taking care of children. In addition, this is the only group of households 
with migration experience in which females do not self report their health to have worsened. 
Nonetheless, the families of households with return migrants are more likely to be fragmented 
than households without migration experience. 
 
Households with absent migrants share many of the characteristics found in those with return 
migrants, and in addition see a positive effect on their income levels. However, we find a few 
results  unfavourable  to  males  in  absent  migrant  households:  they  are  more  likely  to  be 
unemployed and to feel very unsatisfied with their lives. In addition, these households do not 
increase their expenditure on health, which is of particular concern given that females living in 
these households are more likely to self report being in bad health.  
 
Households receiving remittances differ to those with return migrants in that their males are 
more likely to be unemployed, their females report being in bad health and they spend less time 
taking care of children. In the aggregate, however, households receiving remittances improve 
their access to financial services to fund businesses. 
 
When we turn to look across all the households with migration experience, we see that, on 
average,  migration  appears  to  reduce  their  likelihood  of  being  in  poverty.  Households  with 
migration experience would be more likely to fall under the US$2 a day and extreme poverty 
lines if they did not have remittances, signalling the importance of remittances in reducing their 
vulnerability. 
 
We  find  increases  in  per  capita  expenditure  on  education  in  households  with  migration 
experience, but we do not find increases in school enrolment, which might by a consequence of 
single parenthood (to the small extent that migration appears to cause this) or a lack of parental 
authority  in  the  absence  of  the  migrant,  one  of  the  potentially  negative  consequences  of 
migration in the Colombian case. However, higher expenditures in education can signal greater 
concern with the quality of education, maybe through an increase in enrolment in private as 
opposed to public schools. 
 
 
4. Conclusions and policy recommendations 
 
The evidence collected in this paper shows that most Colombian migrants are concentrated in a 
few destination countries, with around 35 per cent currently living in the US, followed by 23 per 
cent in Spain and 20 per cent in Venezuela. While different datasets produce different results, 
Colombian  absent  migrants  tend  to  have  more  years  of  schooling than  the  average  citizen 
(around 12 years compared to 9 years). In addition, 30 per cent of migrants over the age of 25 
have tertiary education, compared to just 5 per cent of the population in Colombia. Also, both 
absent and return migrants are more likely to be female than male.   
 
Remittances  have  become  an  increasingly  important  source  of  financial  support  for  many 
Colombian households.  Our  data indicate  that around 55 per cent of absent migrants  send 
remittances, and that monthly per-capita income is increased by up to US$62 in households 
receiving  remittances  from  any  source  (average  monthly  per-capita  income  in  Colombia  is 
US$228).   
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While it is sometimes argued that migration and remittances can increase dependency among 
household  members  left  behind,  our  findings  indicate  that  there  is  no  significant  impact  on 
labour force participation in households with migrants. However, remittances do appear to have 
a  negative  effect  on  labour  force  participation.  According  to  our  results,  individuals  (and 
particularly females) in households receiving remittances from any source are nearly 4 per cent 
less likely to participate in the labour market. 
 
Migration  and  remittances  affect  expenditure  patterns  in  migrant  households  in  Colombia. 
Having  a  migrant  in  the  household  (either  absent  or  returned)  increases  total  per  capita 
expenditure by nearly US$35 per month while households that receive remittances increase per 
capita  expenditures  h  somewhere  in  the  range  between  US$37  and  US$49  per  month. 
Households that receive remittances from a family member are 5 per cent more likely to own a 
home, while households receiving remittances from any source are 4 per cent more likely to 
own a home. 
 
Migration  appears  to  increase  household  monthly  per-capita  savings  by  US$6,  while 
remittances from relatives increase per-capita monthly savings by US$4. However, migration 
and  remittances  do  not  appear  to  increase  the  probability  of  households  holding  a  savings 
account with a financial institution. Migration and remittances increase spending on education 
but do not seem to have an impact on levels of school attendance. Migration increases total 
spending  on  health  by  around  US$14  per  month  (particularly  in  households  with  return 
migrants), while remittances from any source increase total health expenditure by about US$24 
per month. It is interesting that this increased expenditure does not appear to have changed the 
perceptions of members of migrant households about their health status. Indeed, individuals 
living in a household with an absent migrant are almost 4 per cent less likely to state that their 
health  is  good.  This  opinion  seems  to  be  particularly  prevalent  among  female  household 
members. 
 
Our data suggest that both migration and remittances are connected to family fragmentation. 
Households with migration experience are around 8 per cent less likely to keep their immediate 
families together, with this effect particularly pronounced in the sub-group of households with 
return migrants, who are 10 per cent less likely to do so. More encouragingly, it appears that 
both men and women living in a household with return migrants are more likely than those living 
in  other  types  of  household  to  spend  time  taking  care  of  children  living  in  the  household, 






At present, many Colombians are working abroad illegally, which prevents them from migrating 
with their whole families, and once abroad, prevents them from visiting them due to the risk of 
not being able to migrate again. Formal circular migration programmes could therefore help to 
capitalise several of the benefits of international migration and avoid various costs of illegal 
migration  which  presumably  include  higher  levels  of  family  fragmentation,  the  lack  of 
transferability of new knowledge, and human rights abuses. 
 
Colombia has concluded some international agreements to promote circular migration, although 
their scope is currently very limited. There is one with Spain, which until recently had just 400 
beneficiary workers and organised some workshops on labour and communitarian training and   41 




As argued by Naik et al. (2008), circular migration programmes can be extremely valuable for 
migrant sending countries, since it allows migrants to work formally for a number of months in a 
foreign  country  while  still  having  incentives  to  return  home.  Migrant  beneficiaries  of  these 
programs have been found to remit more and to return home with savings and new knowledge, 
which  fits  with  the  positive  findings  we  derived  regarding  return  migration‟s  development 
impacts  in  the  previous  section.  As  discussed  by  Chappell  and  Glennie  (2009),  circular 
migration has been used by some African countries to promote „brain gain‟, that is, the return of 
skilled workers to their home countries.  
 
According to our results, households with return migrants are the ones with better results when 
compared either to households with absent migrants or without migration experience, thus, the 
objective evidence provided in this paper suggests that it may well be desirable to encourage 
absent migrants to return. 
 
Since the illegal status of many Colombian absent migrants constrains their ability to return 
home  either  temporarily  or  permanently,  any  policy  legalising  their  status  should  seek  to 
improve welfare among households with migration experience and increase the opportunities for 
families to reunite. Given that the legal status of migrants is decided by host countries, it is up to 
the Colombian government to promote agreements with those countries to grant its migrants 
temporary amnesties, which ideally would allow them to have residence, in  the case of the 
United States, or to hold what Katseli et al. (2006) call a „Smart Visa‟ (such as a visa allowing 
circular migration, multi-entry, etc). Previous evidence provided by Gaviria (2004), and Medina 
and Posso (2009), shows not only that Colombian migrants in countries like the United States 
are positively selected, but also that return migrants are negatively selected; that is, the most 
able Colombians are those most likely to leave the country, and are less likely to return. The 
Colombian government should therefore seek to facilitate the return of the most skilled migrants 
by the establishment of temporary return programs targeted to them. 
 
In the meantime, the government could provide Colombian current and potential migrants with 
information  regarding  the  legal  framework  concerning  labour  rights  and  duties  in  their  host 
countries, to enable them to exercise their rights more effectively. As the experience of the 
Philippines has shown, this can allow migrants to gain higher wages in the long run. 
 
Also, the promotion of a more development-friendly set of requirements for Colombian migrants 
in their main destination countries would help to expand migration opportunities to people at the 
lower end of the income distribution, hence leveraging the distributive impact of migration and 
remittances, providing an additional guarantee against income losses, and adding a channel of 
mobility to those currently available to the poorest in Colombia. 
 
Policymakers in Colombia should also seek to make better use of agencies that recruit migrant 
workers  (and  particularly  private  sector  organisations)  which  could  be  playing  a  key  role  in 
increasing  the  opportunities  available  to  Colombian  labour  migrants  in  other  countries.  At 
present, a lack of regulation and enforceability make these agencies unreliable guarantors of 
migrant rights, and simultaneously, diminishes the incentives of the private sector to provide 
services in that field. However, where these agencies are carefully regulated they appear to be 
                                                           
13  See  Naik  et  al.  (2008),  which  recommends  that  the  cost-effectiveness  of  these  programs should  be carefully 
analysed, taking into account that in some cases, there is a share of the remittances sent by migrants in these 
programs  that  is  retained  by  the  governments  to  cover  administrative  costs,  as  it  is  the  case  with  agreements 
between Caribbean countries and Canada.   42 
more effective, such as in countries like Philippines and Vietnam. As highlighted by Naik et al. 
(2008), the number of private recruitment agencies in the Philippines went from a few in 1975 to 
thousands  10  years  later,  as  the  number  of  Philippine  migrant  workers  in  the  Middle  East 
increased from about 1,500 to 300,000.
14  Meanwhile, Nguyen  et  al.  (2009)  report that from 
2002, when labour export became a government strategy in Vietnam, to 2009, the number of 
labour export enterprises increased massively in line with the growth of labour migration, with an 
average of more than 70,000 workers being sent abroad annually.
15 In both of these countries, 
there is an awareness of the need to monitor and regulate these agencies in order to protect 
migrants during all stages of their migration process, and to prevent labourers from becoming 
illegal migrants.  
 
The  Colombian  National  Government  has  assigned  this  task  to  the  SENA,  which  can  both 
assess the labour needs in the main destination countries, and also provide the required training 
for the positions available abroad to potential Colombian migrants.  
 
Finally,  governments  should  be  aware  that  decisions  about  the  use  of  remittances  are 
exclusively  private,  and  that  policymakers  can  only  provide  a  friendly  environment  for  their 
investment.  Policies  designed  to  promote  a  more  efficient  use  of  remittances,  like  training 
remittance senders and recipients on the use of financial services, are more likely to increase 
the amount of money remitted and, by using the less expensive channels, actually received by 
their recipients. According to our survey, nearly 90 per cent of Colombian migrants remit their 
money through formal channels. Increasing the access of financial institutions and reducing the 
costs  associated  with  these  services  should  continue  to  be  an  important  component  of  the 
policy agenda.  
                                                           
14 In addition, the annual revenue of 1200 licensed recruitment agencies, operating in the Philippines in 2004, was 
over US$400 million. See Martin (2006), quoted by IOM (2008). 
15 A similar experience has taken place in Sri Lanka. See Gunatilleke (1991), quoted by IOM (2008).   43 
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Appendix A: Survey sampling strategy 
 
Table 17 shows some basic information about the population and the number of households 
(with migration experience) per metropolitan area. According to the Colombian 2005 Population 
Census, almost 3 per cent of all households (and nearly 4 per cent of urban households) have 
had experience of migration. Of the total number of households with migration experience, 65 
per  cent  live  in  the  main  13  metropolitan  areas,  and  86.4  per  cent  of  those  in  the  13 
metropolitan areas live in Bogotá, Medellín, Cali, Barranquilla, Pereira and Manizales.
16  
 
As a result of this distribution, our sampling method included surveys collected in these six 
metropolitan areas, where households with migration experience represent just over 5 per cent 
of  all  households.  We  added  Cúcuta  (chosen  probabilistically  within  the  group  of  the  other 
metropolitan areas) to the survey in order to improve the statistical robustness of the exercise. 
Since the main 13 metropolitan areas have a high incidence of international migration when 
compared  with  smaller  urban  areas,  and  even  more  when  compared  to  rural  areas,  and 
additionally, collecting data in smaller urban areas or rural areas would be considerably more 
expensive than it is in the main metropolitan areas, we believe that the areas chosen will let us 
learn the key aspects of international migration in Colombia at reasonable costs. 
 
The following steps summarise the sampling strategy adopted to collect the data. Within each 
metropolitan area we randomly selected a section, with a probability of selection proportional to 
the  share  of  households  with  migration  experience  in  each  section,  according  to  2005 
Colombian Population Census. Within each section, we selected blocks of households again 
with probability of selection proportional to the share of households with migration experience in 
each block, and finally, within each block we selected the same number of households with 
migration and without migration experience. All the surveys were collected between October 31 




Households determine the household head (HH), usually pointing to the person with the highest 
earnings in the household, or the oldest member of the household. In our survey, the interviewer 
asks  the  household  head  to  answer  the  questionnaire,  but  if  the  household  head  is  not 
available,  he  or  she  asks  for  a  person  18  or  older  who  knows  household  members  and 
migrants. 
 
                                                           
16 The other metropolitan areas are Bucaramanga, Cartagena, Cúcuta, Ibagué, Pasto, Montería and Villavicencio. 
17 1595 households were interviewed, but 395 households either provided incomplete information (1 household), 
declined to answer (273 households) or were absent at the time of the interview (105 households).   48 
Table 17: Sampling strategy 
 





















Bucaramanga  4  266,150  7,823  2.9%  1,002,852  11,355  1.1%  46.5% 
Barranquilla  2  359,863  13,158  3.7%  1,565,382  20,558  1.3%  45.3% 
Cali  2  579,692  38,582  6.7%  2,153,825  60,060  2.8%  73.6% 
Cúcuta  4  184,401  5,343  2.9%  738,314  8,921  1.2%  38.5% 
Manizales  2  114,686  5,437  4.7%  408,596  7,602  1.9%  62.0% 
Medellín  10  896,113  35,493  4.0%  3,294,649  52,896  1.6%  62.3% 
Pereira  4  190,296  19,287  10.1%  693,957  30,883  4.5%  78.9% 
Bogotá-Soacha  2  2,036,472  53,060  2.6%  7,138,856  77,358  1.1%  43.2% 
Cartagena  1  206,634  5,922  2.9%  892,163  9,127  1.0%  37.1% 
Ibagué  1  136,441  3,136  2.3%  490,976  4,357  0.9%  38.3% 
Montería  1  84,578  782  0.9%  379,249  1,152  0.3%  15.4% 
Pasto  1  96,364  1,234  1.3%  379,698  1,705  0.4%  25.6% 
Villavicencio  1  102,795  1,781  1.7%  377,247  2,507  0.7%  27.9% 
Total 13 areas  35  5,254,485  191,038  3.6%  19,515,764  288,481  1.5%  48.7% 
Rest of the Country  1,079  5,474,578  105,022  1.9%  21,659,089  174,198  0.8%  24.5% 
Total  1,114  10,729,063  296,060  2.8%  41,174,853  462,679  1.1%  34.3% 
Source: SEI (2008) based on Colombian 2005 Population Census 
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Appendix B: Methodology 
 
Below  we  present  the  methodology  and  the  results  of  evaluating  the  impact  of  having 
experience of migration or receiving remittances on a set of household outcomes. As has been 
well documented elsewhere, households with members that migrate are a self-selected subset 
of the whole population. Selection takes place according to household characteristics as well as 
conditions  at  home  and  abroad  at  the  moment  of  migration.  In  addition,  according  to  our 
definition, households with migration experience are those in which a former household member 
left the country (regardless of whether they are still absent or have returned). It might also be 
the case that the household with migration experience has one household member absent and 
another returned. This means that there is selection within the household of the person who 




We use propensity score matching methods to estimate the impact of migration experience and 
remittances on household outcomes.
18 The key identifying assumption of this method is the 
independence assumption, according to which, given a set of variables, X, either the outcomes 
do not depend on migration experience or remittances, or any difference between the outcomes 
of households with and without migration experience (or receiving remittances) do not depend 
on the household having migration experience (or receiving remittances).
19  
 
The first part says that for people with similar characteristics, X, the outcome observed for those 
without migration experience is similar to the one that would have been observed for those with 
migration experience had they not have had migration experience; and similarly for receiving 
remittances. The second part only requires that on average, the outcomes would have been 
similar. 
 
As  noted  by  Heckman  et  al.  (1999),  the  matching  methods  assumes  in  our  case  that  the 
decision to migrate is made only on the basis of a set of variables X, and rules out the possibility 
of  selection  based  on  characteristics  observed  by  the  population  of  interest  but  not  by  the 
economist, like any potential gain of migration. It is also consistent with the possibility that either 
potential gains of migration do not vary across people, or that if there is any variation in those 
gains, that individuals do not decide whether to migrate on the basis of those gains. 
 
Note  that  if  potential  gains  of  migration  do  not  vary  across  people,  our  effects  would  be 
consistent with several situations that people face at the moment to decide whether to migrate. 
Suppose we have two identical individuals, but one with (unobserved) relatives and the other 
without relatives in other country, based on which the former migrates while the latter does not. 
Then,  our  estimate  would  be  unbiased  as  long  as  the  outcome  observed  for  these  two 
individuals, had the former not migrated (that is, if neither of them migrated), were similar. 
 
Now suppose both individuals have relatives in the chosen destination country, but they might 
have potential differences in the gains from migrating. In this case, our estimates would also be 
unbiased as long as the decision to migrate did not depend on that potential difference in gains 
from migration. This is a likely situation, since there is a considerable amount of uncertainty 
concerning the magnitude of the gain at the moment that the decision to migrate or not is made. 
For two otherwise identical people, as long as that potential difference is not exaggerated, it is 
                                                           
18 We evaluate the impact of migration on households with migration experience, that is, our parameter of interest is 
the treatment on the treated,  = E(Y1-Y0| D=1, P(X)). Our estimation of  is made only on the support of X for which 
we find both treatment and comparison population, thus satisfying the balancing property. 
19 See Heckman, LaLonde and Smith (1999) and Heckman, Ichimura and Todd (1997, 1998)   50 
very likely that the decision to migrate would finally depend on concerns different than the gap in 
the gains. 
 
To obtain impact through matching estimators, it is essential to correctly specify the probability 
that  a  household  experiences  migration  (and/or  receives  remittances).  When  we  study  the 
effects of migration experience, our dependent variable is equal to one if the household has a 
former member who left the country in the last ten years, living currently in other country, that is, 
if the household has an absent migrant in other country, or if the household has a member who 
lived in other country for at least three months and is currently living in the household, that is, if 
the household has a returnee. According to this definition, our set of X variables should be 
conformed of predetermined variables before migration took place. Nonetheless, since our data 
is a cross section collected in  2008, we do not have self-reported data at  the moment the 
household became a household with migration experience, that is, at the moment migration of 
the household member took place, which could have happened up to ten years ago. 
 
Asking interviewed households about their situation several years ago is a common practice in 
this type of survey but is not always useful as the interviewee may have trouble answering 
retrospective questions. Our survey asked whether current household members had lived in this 
household five years ago, whether they were working, taking care of children etc., and how 
much  money  they  earned.  We  also  asked  current  household  members  whether  migrant 
members were working, taking care or children, and how much were they earning, just before 
they left the country. We also know the migrant‟s age and education.  
 
Not  entirely  surprisingly,  there  were  very  high  non  response  rates  for  the  question  about 
people‟s earnings five years ago. Finally, we have information of former household members 
not living in the household currently. We use this retrospective information to get difference in 
difference matching estimators of labour force participation, unemployment, home ownership, 
financial access (having a bank account and having an account for credit to fund a business). 
Difference-in-differences  matching  estimates  have  been  proven  to  perform  very  well,  and 




The setting in which we apply our matching estimators has several strengths. We use the same 
survey and homogeneous definitions of all our variables and outcomes for the whole sample, 
households in our survey share the same labour market, we can control for several variables 
like retrospective labour participation, home ownership, access to land for business, and access 
to the financial sector, that are key to correct for the possibility of having positive selection in our 
sample, that is, the possibility that for example, the better off households were the ones with 
migration experience. Such positive selection might arise in our context due to the barriers to 
migrate for Colombians.
21 In addition, for the cases in which we can get difference-in-differences 
estimators, we can obtain unbiased estimates whenever the bias, conditional on X, does not 
change over time. 
 
Previous work by Akee (2008) and McKenzie et al. (2006) among others, has addressed the 
specific question of whether selection into migration is based on observable or unobservable 
variables. Nonetheless, their specific cases are unlikely to resemble the Colombian case,  in 
                                                           
20 See for example Heckman, Ichimura and Todd (1997, and Heckman, Ichimura, Smith and Todd (1998), where they 
find that difference-in-difference matching estimators were either unbiased or closer to the experimental estimates 
than the cross section estimates. 
21 Restrictions include the need to obtain a visa (for any country but few exceptions like South American nations 
excluding Venezuela, one of the most important Colombian‟s destinies, and Korea), which requires in most cases 
travelling to Bogotá (the only city with consulates that issue visas), prolonged waiting times, and generally paying 
very high costs.   51 
which there are different motivations to migrate, different horizons of migration, restrictions to 
migrate, etc. In other words, the evidence against using matching estimators with the Colombian 
data is not compelling.  
 
Determinants of migration experience and remittances 
 
The next step is to include in the propensity score estimation a set of variables which we can 
reasonably argue resemble the household‟s situation at the moment of migration (or close to). 
Since about 55 per cent of migrants left the country within the previous five years, we include 
variables we expect not to have changed in that period, like gender or education, and those we 
can  estimate  their  level  in  the  past,  such  as  age.  In  the  specific  case  of  migrants  we  ask 
respondents  some  recall  information  on  the  status  of  the  migrant  right  before  leaving  the 
household. 
 
To define the control variables of the propensity score we use information of current household 
members,  household  migrants,  and  former  household  members  not  living  in  the  household 
currently, to determine the situation of the household right before they became households with 
migration experience. For example, when defining the number of individual in the household five 
years ago, we count the number of people living in the  household currently, the number of 
migrants of the household, and the number of those members formerly living in the household 
but not living there currently. 
 
We include in the propensity score the number of households members between 0 and 5, 6 and 
17, 18 and 29, 30 and 39, 40 and 49, 50 and 59 and 60 or more years of age (five years before 
the time of the survey).We also include variables that seek to quantify the human capital of the 
household: the lowest and highest number of years of education of members of the household 
25  and  more  and  their  respective  squared  terms.  We  also  include  a  dummy  variable  that 
indicates whether any of the current members of the household gave a different answer to the 
question “where did you live “five years ago?” to the rest of its members. We also use some key 
baseline conditions like a dummy variables that indicate whether the household had an account 
in a financial institution five years ago, whether it used an account to fund a business five years 
ago, and whether it owned the house where it lived, whether it had the possibility to exploit land 
for economic purposes, and whether it owned a business five years ago; the share of women 12 
or more that participated in the labour market five years ago, the share of men 12 or more that 
participated in the labour market five years ago, the number of people with complete higher 
education or more, and interaction terms between having had an account five years ago and the 
highest and lowest number of years of education of all member of the household and their 
squared terms, and with the number of people with higher education or more in the household. 
The  same  interactions  were  calculated  for  the  dummy  variable  that  indicates  whether  the 
household had an account to fund a business five years ago, for the shares of women and men 
participating in the labour market, for the dummy variables that indicates whether the household 
owned  a  house five  years  ago,  whether  it  had  access to  land for  economic  purposes,  and 
whether it owned a business five years ago. 
 
Table 18 shows the marginal effects based on our propensity score estimates. The table has 
four columns. The first three columns show the marginal effect of changing the control variables 
in one unit on the probability of having migration experience, first, regardless of whether the 
household  has  absent  or  returnee  migrants,  then  for  households  that  only  have  absent 
migrants, or both absents and returnees migrants, and the third column for households that only 
have returnees, or both returnees and absents migrants. That is, the set of households having 
both absents and returnees migrant are in columns two and three. The fourth to sixth columns 
show the marginal effects on the probability of receiving remittances. Here we consider two 
cases.  In  the  first  one,  which  we  call  family,  we  compare  those  households  receiving   52 
remittances from a former member with households without migration experience that do not 
receive remittances (results do not change much if we add to the comparison group households 
receiving remittances from other sources different to relatives). The second case, which we call 
all,  compares  households  receiving  remittances  from  any  source  with  households  without 
migration experience not receiving remittances. 
 
The table only includes variables satisfying the balancing property, that is, those for which it was 
possible to find matches in the comparison group. The table shows that households with more 
members aged 0-5 in year t-5 are more likely to have migration experience (especially absent 
migrants), while those with more members in the age bracket 30-49 in year t-5 are less likely. In 
order to have an idea of the support on which our parameters are estimated we present in 
Figure 9 the distribution of the probabilities of being a household with migration experience or 
receiving remittances from family (results do not change when we consider remittances from 
any  source)
22.  The  continuous  line  shows  the  probability  of  households  having  migration 
experience (top left figure) or receiving remittances (other three figures), while the dashed line 
shows it for the comparison households, which have much smaller probabilities. The common 
support covers probabilities below 0.4.
23 By matching households with similar probabilities at the 
moment  of  getting  the  required  counterfactual,  the  matching  method  corrects  for  these 
differences in the densities of the two populations. 
 
The probability of having migration experience in general or absent migrants is also higher the 
higher is the schooling of the household member with more years of education, although this 
happens at a decreasing rate. For example, if that member has 16 years of schooling (higher 
education), the probability of that household having migration experience would be 24 percent 
higher relative to a household where that member has only 6 years of schooling (first year of 
secondary education). The probability of having migration experience is also higher when the 
household had an account in a financial institution in year t-5.  
 
There  are  some  interesting  results  when  the  schooling  of  the  member  of  highest  years  of 
education is interacted with financial variables. A household is more likely to have returnees if in 
year t-5 it had and account in a financial institution and more schooling, but less likely when it 
had an account for a business and more schooling, as measured by the lowest number of years 
of education of its members 25 and older. Land ownership provides some additional insights. A 
household is more likely to have returnees when it had land in year t-5 and more schooling 
(measured by the education of the member with more years of schooling), while the opposite 
happens in the case of absentee migrants. That is, land possession would be a reason for the 
typical returnee to return, and the typical absentee to stay absent.
24  
 
                                                           
22 By support we mean the values of the probability of having migration experience, P(D=1|X), for which we can find 
both households actually with and without migration experience. 
23  Note  that  the  standard  Stata  code  uses  as  common  support  the  range  between  the  lowest  and  the  highest 
estimated probabilities for the treatment group, that is, the estimated probabilities for households actually having 
migration experience or receiving remittances. In the case of the probability of having migration experience, the 
common  support  should  include  probabilities  below  0.374,  while  the  Stata  code  would  include  as  well  those 
households with migration experience which probabilities are between 0.374 and 0.543. According to the figure, this 
should not be a concern in our case since the mass of treated that goes beyond the highest probabilities among the 
comparison household is negligible (only 10 out of more than 500 observations). 
24 Interpreting these results requires some speculation but could suggest some form of attachment to the country 
when land is owned. For migrants that left in the late 1990s it can be related to low property values (due to recession 
and insecurity) at the moment of migrating, which prevented them for selling their property, and higher values later 
once the economy began to recover, around 2005. In the case of absentees the motivations can work just in the 
opposite direction. They might have been able to sell their property or are threatened to return. In any case, land 
possession seems to influence the decision to return or stay abroad.   53 
Table 18: Marginal effects on the probabilities of having migration experience and receiving 
remittances 
 
Source: DOTM Colombian Household Survey (authors‟ calculations) 
Note: The numbers in the first two columns are the percentages aggregating by row. 
 
 
dF/dx z dF/dx z dF/dx z dF/dx z dF/dx z
0-5 (Number of people 5 years ago) 0.009 1.66* 0.009 2.82** 0.004 1.07 0.003 2.49** 0.013 2.41**
6-17 (Number of people 5 years ago) -0.001 -0.42 0.000 -0.21 -0.001 -0.56 -0.001 -1.26 -0.002 -0.15
18-29 (Number of people 5 years ago) -0.005 -1.12 -0.005 1.92* 0.000 0.01 -0.001 1.64*
30-39 (Number of people 5 years ago) -0.015 2.68** -0.011 2.99** 0.000 0.15 -0.003 -2.58** 0.000 -0.08
40-49 (Number of people 5 years ago) -0.019 -3.27** -0.011 -3.47** -0.002 -1.85* -0.002 -0.33
50-59 (Number of people 5 years ago) -0.008 -1.32 -0.001 -0.21 -0.003 -2.13** -0.005 -0.86
60 + (Number of people 5 years ago) -0.001 -0.17* -0.001 -0.37 -0.001 -0.95 0.004 0.62
Higuest years of Eduaction of Members of Hhold 25+ 0.024 2.39** 0.008 2.13** 0.001 -2.73** 0.033 2.29**
(Higuest years of Eduaction of Members of Hhold 25+ )² -0.001 -1.91* 0.000 -0.98 0.000 -2.4** -0.001 -1.77*
Lowest years of Eduaction of Members of Hhold 25+ -0.013 -1.43 -0.002 -0.5 -0.002 -0.39 -0.001 -2.89** -0.030 -2.25**
 (Lowest years of Eduaction of Members of Hhold 25+)² 0.001 0.91 0.000 -0.37 0.000 0.33 0.001 1.73*
Number of people in household 5 years ago
¿Did some current member of the 
household response different to the 
rest of members to the question "where 
did you live 5 years ago?" -0.002 -0.17 -0.001 -0.10 -0.003 -0.39 0.001 0.39 -0.003 -0.19
¿Did the household have an account in 
a financial institution five years ago? 0.140 2.29** 0.008 0.26 0.033 1.12 0.011 0.98 -0.013 -0.26
¿Did the household used such account 
to fund business five years ago? -0.005 -0.06 0.927 2.64** -0.019 -0.51 0.235 1.35 -0.029 -0.9
Labor participation 5 years ago (Males) -0.018 -0.48 -0.002 -0.36 -0.002 -0.87 0.054 1.17
Labor participation 5 years ago (Females) 0.016 0.59 0.007 0.27 -0.020 -0.9 0.014 1.46 0.070 1.79*
¿Did the household own the house the 
house where it lived 5 years ago? 0.018 0.5 0.001 0.08 -0.015 -0.77 -0.001 -0.13 0.053 1.16
¿Did the household have access to land 5 years ago? 0.695 0.52 0.994 2.28** -0.030 -1.58 0.999 1.84* 0.992 1.8*
¿Did teh household own at least one business 5 years ago? 0.049 0.79 -0.004 -0.49 -0.006 0.29 0.022 0.75 -0.040 -1.86*
Number of people with complete tertiary eduaction or more -0.001 -0.03 -0.020 -1.11 0.006 0.95 0.003 0.05
Account_5*Highest years of education -0.024 -2.87** -0.006 -1.21 -0.003 -0.57 -0.002 -1.45 -0.006 -0.49
(Account_5*Highest years of education)² 0.001 2.89** 0.000 1.41 0.000 -0.04 0.000 1.45 -0.001 0.86
Account_5*Lowest years of education 0.007 0.96 0.005 1.02 0.003 0.64 0.001 0.98 0.012 1.32
(Account_5*Lowest years of education)² -0.001 -1.32 0.000 -0.87 0.000 -1.2 0.000 -1.64* -0.001 -1.88*
Account_5*Number of people with tertiary education or more 0.041 2.99** 0.003 0.72 -0.040 -1.03
Account to fund business*Highest years of education -0.021 -0.91 -0.021 -1.84* -0.001 -0.04 -0.005 -1.60 0.109 2.06**
(Account to fund business*Highest years of education)² 0.001 1.04 0.001 2.28** 0.000 0.37 0.000 2.53** -0.004 -1.86*
Account to fund business*Lowest years of education 0.038 1.36 -0.016 -1.95* 0.021 1.17 -0.003 -0.79 -0.093 -2.22**
(Account to fund business*Lowest years of education)² -0.002 -1.51 0.001 1.2 -0.002 1.65* 0.000 0.87 0.005 2.22**
Account to fund business*Number of people with tertiary education or more -0.052 -1.3 -0.114 2.35** -0.042 -1.21 -0.071 -3.52** -0.023 -0.29
Labor participation (women)*Highest years of education -0.003 -0.84 -0.007 -1.08 0.005 0.89 -0.005 -2.43** -0.022 -1.98**
(Labor participation (women)*Highest years of education)² 0.000 1.12 0.000 -0.58 0.000 1.96** 0.001 1.19
Labor participation (women)*Lowest years of education -0.005 -0.65 0.002 0.33 -0.006 -1.05 0.003 1.64* 0.018 1.67*
(Labor participation (women)*Lowest years of education)² 0.001 0.91 0.000 0.21 0.000 1.04 0.000 -0.98 -0.001 -1.44
Labor participation (women)*Number of people with tertiary education or more 0.012 0.49 -0.031 -2.51** 0.002 0.14 -0.002 -0.46 0.039 1.42
Labor participation (men)*Highest years of education -0.006 -0.63 -0.033 -2**
(Labor participation (men)*Highest years of education)² 0.000 0.87 0.001 1.88*
Labor participation (men)*Lowest years of education 0.010 1.38 0.008 2.55**
(Labor participation (men)*Lowest years of education)² -0.001 -1.48 0.000 -0.03
Labor participation (men)*Number of people with tertiary education or more -0.001 -0.33 0.014 1.28 0.002 0.46 -0.072 -1.85*
ownhouse_5*Highest years of education -0.004 -0.49 0.001 0.54 0.001 0.14 0.000 -0.05 -0.007 -0.65
(ownhouse_5*Highest years of education)² 0.000 0.68 0.000 0.65 0.000 0.83 0.000 0.33
ownhouse_5*Lowest years of education 0.000 0.26 -0.001 -0.23 0.001 0.21 0.008 1.03
(ownhouse_5*Lowest years of education)² 0.000 0.04 0.000 0.29 0.000 0.04 -0.001 -1.32
ownhouse_5*Number of people with tertiary education or more -0.009 -0.59 -0.009 -2.01** 0.039 1
land_5*Highest years of education -0.043 -0.46 0.147 -1.96** 0.086 1.68* -0.058 -1.72* -0.185 -1.36
(land_5*Highest years of education)² 0.003 0.55 0.009 1.9* -0.005 -1.66* 0.004 1.71* 0.011 1.26
land_5*Lowest years of education -0.006 -0.22 0.036 1.18 0.003 0.25 0.029 1.47 0.066 0.89
(land_5*Lowest years of education)² 0.000 0.1 -0.003 -1.29 -0.001 -0.97 -0.002 -1.48 -0.005 -0.9
land_5*Number of people with tertiary education or more -0.153 -0.81 -0.336 -1.58 0.102 1.08 -0.132 -1.62 -0.432 -1.13
business_5*Highest years of education -0.022 -2.24** -0.006 -0.98 -0.003 -1.2
(business_5*Highest years of education)² 0.001 2.57** 0.000 1.10 0.000 0.91
business_5*Lowest years of education 0.013 1.33 0.005 0.92 0.001 0.53 0.025 1.44
(business_5*Lowest years of education)² -0.001 -1.03 0.000 -0.41 0.000 -0.33 0.000 -0.5 -0.002 -1.37




Migration  Experience Receiving Remittances
Absent or Returnee Absents Returnees Family All
0.1935
949 901 731 880 949
0.131 0.1151 0.1131 0.2132  54 
The estimates also show that the probability of receiving remittances is higher for households 
with more members aged 0-5, and lower for those with more members ages 30-39 in year t-5. It 
is also higher the higher is the education of the most educated member of the household 25 or 
older, although its importance grows at a decreasing rate. Households with low schooling (of the 
member with lowest years of education aged 25 or more), have a lower probability to receive 
remittances, while those that owned land in t-5 are more likely to receive remittances. 
 
Figure 9: Distribution of the probabilities of having migration experience and receiving 
remittances for households 
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